On the Freedom to Associate or Not to Associate with Others by Kleven, Thomas
On the Freedom To Associate Or Not To Associate With Others
Thomas Kleven
Abstract
This article discusses the freedom to associate or not to 
associate with others.  Associational issues are pervasive in 
the law, and arise on both an individual and a societal level.  
Within societies one party may want to have an association with 
another who doesn’t want the association, or parties may want to 
have an association that others find objectionable or may want 
not to have an association that others favor.  In all of these 
situations society as a whole must decide whether to empower one 
party to impose an unwanted relationship on others, and whether 
to prohibit associations that parties want or impel associations 
that parties don’t want.  Similar issues arise among societies, 
where parties may resort to international law to resolve 
associational conflicts or in the absence thereof will have to 
work out associational conflicts among themselves.  The thesis 
of the paper is that there is no general moral or legal 
principle for resolving such associational issues.  Rather their 
resolution depends on historical and social context, and 
ultimately on societies’ ever evolving values.  In particular, 
associational issues will affected by the extent to which a 
society’s values are more individualistic or collective.  By way 
of illustrating the point the article discusses the factors that 
might come in to play in a variety of associational contexts, 
including marriage, race relations, emigration and immigration, 
and others.    
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2ON THE FREEDOM TO ASSOCIATE OR NOT TO
ASSOCIATE WITH OTHERS
Thomas Kleven*
It is commonly asserted in casual conversation that there 
is or should be a right to associate or not to associate with 
whom one chooses.  In fact, however, societies frequently induce 
associations people don’t want to have and deter those they do.  
This article addresses the types of situations that give rise to 
associational issues and the considerations relevant to their 
resolution.  It does not attempt to develop a general theory of 
free association, about the possibility of which I am skeptical 
given the unresolvable value disputes underlying all 
associational issues.  However, unpacking how differing 
associational issues are resolved in practice within and among 
societies should shed some light on what those values are.
Part A outlines the types of situations in which 
associational issues arise.  How associational issues are 
resolved depends greatly on whether a more individualistic or 
collective perspective is brought to bear.  Part B develops this 
point in general through a discussion of Locke and Aristotle, 
and Part C illustrates the point through a brief excursion into 
the institution of marriage.  Part D then analyzes in more 
detail how the process plays out as regards conflicts among 
*
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3society’s members, while Part E does the same when society 
itself is a party.1
A.  Types of Associational Issues
Associational conflicts abound in social life.  Within a 
society Party A may wish to associate with Party B, who may not 
wish to associate with Party A.  Examples include A’s desire, 
not shared by B, to be friends with or to marry or to remain 
married to B, to go to school with or live in the same 
neighborhood as B, to belong to the same club or professional 
association as B, and many more.2  To resolve these conflicts 
society could empower A to force the association on B, empower B 
to avoid the association, or have society itself resolve the 
matter pursuant to criteria which may take into account the 
wishes of the parties and other considerations society deems 
relevant.
Or Party A and Party B may wish to have an association that 
society as a whole finds objectionable, or conversely may wish 
not to have an association that society desires.  Here society 
must decide whether to abide by the wishes of the parties or to 
1
 For other treatments of free association, see, e.g., FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (Amy 
Gutmann, ed., Princeton University Press 1998)(articles discussing from a 
variety of perspectives the importance of free association within a society 
and factors relevant to the resolution of conflicts over free association.
2
 Even situations as seemingly impersonal as taxation, as when society seeks 
to compel those who don’t want to participate to financially support public 
programs that benefit others, entail associational conflicts.  A relationship 
between parties on a purely financial level is still a type of association, 
and poses questions that quite resemble those arising in more intimate 
associations.
4prevent or compel the association against the parties’ wishes.  
Examples of preventing associations that parties wish to have 
include the regulation of sexual behavior or criminalizing 
conspiracies in restraint of trade.  Examples of compelling 
associations parties do not wish to have include the draft or
forced integration.
Or society itself may be involved as a party to an 
associational conflict, as when someone wants to leave or enter 
a society against society’s wishes, or when people occupying 
part of a society wish unilaterally to secede.  Here society 
must decide whether to accede to the other party or impose (or 
try to impose) its will.  Or all the involved parties may be 
societies, as when nations have territorial disputes, or when 
nations wish to impose on or unilaterally withdraw from treaties 
with other nations.  Here the international community may try to 
intervene similar to a society’s resolution of conflicts among 
its members, in the absence of which societies have to work it 
out among themselves. 
In all these associational contexts, someone or some entity 
must ultimately control the outcome of the existence or not of 
an association.  Parties cannot at the same time both be and not 
be friends, be and not be married, attend integrated and 
segregated schools, participate together in some societal 
venture and not participate, be a member and not be a member of 
5society, be a party and not be a party to a treaty.  And all 
societies have ways, through law and custom and at times brute 
force, of allocating the power to control the outcome in such 
associational contexts and of compelling or inducing the 
adherence of their members and others.  The purpose of this 
paper is to examine the ways in which that power is allocated, 
toward the end of identifying and evaluating the considerations 
that underlie the differing resolutions of associational 
conflicts in divergent social contexts.3
B. Who Should Control: Individual and Collective Perspectives
One’s view of the appropriate resolution of associational 
conflicts and of who should control the outcome is dependent to 
a great degree on one’s view of the nature of social life, and 
in particular on the extent to which one has an individualistic 
or communal view of social life.  
The extreme individualistic view posits the primacy of the
3
 This is not the place to attempt a thorough explication of the meaning of 
the concept “society”, which has to do with such factors as interdependence, 
common values and culture, authoritative institutions, territoriality, and 
the perception of its members.  By and large herein I use society to refer to 
something on the order of a country or nation.  But depending on which 
factors are emphasized, the concept is flexible enough to include 
associations from those as small as a nuclear family to the world community 
as a whole.  Consequently, it is possible for someone to be a member of many 
societies at the same time, both public and private and with or without a 
formal governmental structure.  And each society may have its particular 
method of resolving associational issues, although the types of 
considerations that come into play may correspond.  On the nuances in meaning 
of the concepts of society, community and nation, and on their constitutive 
factors, see generally KARL W. DEUTSCH, NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL COMMUNICATION: AN INQUIRY 
INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONALITY (2d ed., M.I.T. Press 1966); ANTHONY D. SMITH, 
NATIONAL IDENTITY (University of Nevada Press 1991). 
6individual.4  The individual precedes society and all 
relationships; and society and any relationship is only 
justifiable or consistent with the rights of the individual when 
people freely choose to enter society or form relationships.  
The extreme communal view posits the primacy of the collective 
over the individual.5  People are inevitably and unavoidably 
enmeshed in relationships because they are by nature social 
animals born into relationships not only with their parents but 
on some level with all others, because their fates are 
inescapably intertwined with the fates of all others and their 
welfare inescapably interdependent with the welfare of all 
others, and because in some way all their actions affect all 
others and they are affected by the actions of all others.6
Consequently, many relationships which may seem to be freely 
chosen or rejected are, in fact, highly conditioned by the 
social circumstances in which people find themselves.  And 
society at large has a legitimate interest in preventing and 
imposing relationships in the name of the common good.  Even 
those relationships that are left to private choice entail a 
4
 As expressed, for example, in the philosophies of John Locke and Robert 
Nozick.  See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (The Liberal Arts Press 
1952) (originally published in 1690); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 
(Basic Books 1974).
5
 As expressed, for example, in the philosophies of Aristotle and Michael J. 
Sandel.  See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS (Cambridge University Press 1988); MICHAEL J. 
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (Cambridge University Press 1982).
6
 There is no exit.  Even death does not fully avoid relationships, which may 
continue in the form of obligations imposed on one’s estate or of the 
influence one continues to have on others after death.
7collective decision that society is better off by so treating 
them.
The reality of social life in all modern, and perhaps all 
historical, societies is some blend of individualistic and 
communal thinking.  Some types of relationships are more or less 
freely chosen, while others are more or less involuntary or 
imposed; and often the line between free choice, involuntariness 
and imposition is blurry.  And the treatment of particular 
relationships as more open to choice or as more subject to 
imposition is a function of both individualistic and collective 
considerations which may cut both ways.  In many if not most 
instances it will be possible to advance both types of 
considerations for or against treating relationships as open to 
choice or subject to imposition.
This interplay between the individual and the collective 
can be found in even the most individualistic and communal 
thinkers; for example, Locke and Aristotle, who certainly 
represent thinkers close to the opposite ends of the spectrum.  
For Locke, political (and by extension social) life begins when 
people in “a state of perfect freedom…by their own consents…make 
themselves members of some body politic.”7  Within given 
societies people then “by compact and agreement” establish rules 
7 LOCKE, supra note 4, at 4, 11.  “Men being, as has been said, by nature all 
free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate without 
his own consent.”  Id. at 54.
8regarding the control and distribution of property and other 
resources,8 and “by common consent” states do the same thing as 
among themselves.9  Locke’s emphasis on consent, which is at the 
heart of contemporary libertarianism,10 is a highly 
individualistic view that at first blush would seem to make it 
difficult ever to justify imposing a political or any other 
relationship on someone.
But there are qualifications that bring collective 
considerations into play.  One is the obligation Locke imposes 
on people not to use their freedom so as “to harm another”,11 and 
the related limitation on their right to freely appropriate the 
common resources of the state of nature that they leave “enough 
and as good … in common for others.”12  These qualifications 
force people into relationships with others whether they like it 
or not: by having to take the interests of others into account 
in planning one’s own behavior, or having to respond to the 
complaints of others that one has violated the qualifications, 
or having to bargain and coordinate with others so as to 
minimize conflict over and prevent overexploitation of 
8 LOCKE, supra note 4, at 27.
9 Id.
10 See NOZICK, supra note 4, at 334 (“Voluntary consent opens the border for 
crossings”; “Treating us with respect by respecting our rights, (the minimal 
state) allows us, individually or with whom we choose, to choose our life and 
to realize our ends and our conception of ourselves, in so far as we can, 
aided by the voluntary cooperation of other individuals possessing the same 
dignity”). 
11 LOCKE, supra note 4, at 5.
12 Id. at 17.
9resources.  Such necessities help explain why Nozick describes 
the development of his Lockean Minimal State less as a voluntary 
coming together than as a spontaneous, almost automatic 
process.13
Second, even with regard to voluntary political 
relationships, once someone “by actual agreement and any express 
declaration” consents thereto, the person becomes “subject to 
the government and dominion of that commonwealth as long as it 
has a being…and can never again be in the liberty of the state 
of nature.”14  Moreover, once someone becomes a member of a 
society “he authorizes the society…to make laws for him as the 
public good of the society shall require,”15 and within the 
society “the majority have a right to act and conclude the 
rest.”16  In short, through consensually entering into a societal 
relationship, one may not withdraw from that relationship and 
can then have (or is deemed to consent to have) many other types 
of relationships imposed on the party pursuant to collective 
considerations.
Locke must, of course, deal with the question of people who
13 NOZICK, supra note 4, at 10-25, 108-119 (describing the “invisible-hand” 
process by which a “minimal state” arises out of the anarchic state of nature 
as a means of people’s protecting their rights and interests).  “Out of 
anarchy, pressed by spontaneous groupings, mutual-protection associations, 
division of labor, market pressures, economies of scale, and rational self-
interest, there arises something very much resembling a minimal state or a 
group of geographically distinct minimal states.” Id. at 16-17.
14 LOCKE, supra note 4, at 69.
15 Id. at 50
16 Id. at 55.
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are born into already existing societies, which is to say most 
people throughout history.  If after a society’s initial 
consensual founding everyone born into it automatically and 
irrevocably became members of it, that would be the end of the 
consensual nature of political relationships.  So Locke 
propounds that “a child is born subject to no country or 
government,”17 and upon becoming an adult is “at liberty what 
government he will put himself under.”18
But what constitutes the exercise of that liberty may be 
quite subtle indeed and highly constrained as a practical 
matter.  Constrained because “the son cannot ordinarily enjoy 
the possessions of his father but under the same terms his 
father did, by becoming a member of the society.”19  Constrained 
because the socialization process and a multitude of economic 
and emotional bonds that exist in all societies make it 
difficult for most people to choose to belong to a society other 
than that which they are born into; and because unlike in 
Locke’s time the entire world is now divided into nation states 
that strictly regulate entry, such that for most people there is 
no other alternative than where they are born.  And subtle 
because due to the practical constraints the process of 
consenting is such that “people take no notice of it and, 
17 Id. at 67
18 Id. at 68.
19 Id. at 67.
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thinking it not done at all, or not necessary, conclude they are 
naturally subjects as they are men."20  It is but a short step 
from here to the general view that in reality many relationships 
are far from freely chosen and that what may appear as consent 
often is an illusion masking the largely involuntary and 
socially constructed nature of relationships. 
This is an easy move for Aristotle whose starting point, 
unlike Locke’s “state of perfect freedom,” is that “man is by 
nature a political animal”;21 and that rather than arising from 
consent “the state is a creation of nature”22 and is “by nature 
clearly prior to the family and to the individual.”23  Social 
life is an involuntary relationship because “a social instinct 
is implanted in all men by nature”24 and “the individual when 
isolated, is not self-sufficing.”25  From this staring point, a 
variety of involuntary relationships exist in society: “For that 
someone should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only 
necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are 
20 Id. 
21 ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 3.
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 4.
24 Id. 
25 Id. Compare SANDEL, supra note 5, at 150: “…to say that the members of a 
society are bound by a sense of community is not simply to say that a great 
many of them profess communitarian sentiments and pursue communitarian aims, 
but rather that they conceive their identity…as defined to some extent by the 
community of which they are a part.  For them, community describes…not a 
relationship they choose as in a voluntary association) but an attachment 
they discover, not merely an attribute but a constituent of their identity.”  
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marked out for subjection, others for rule”;26 and “the male is 
by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, 
and the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, entails to 
all mankind.”27   One can reject Aristotle’s view of these 
particular relationships and still find there a case for the 
non-consensual nature of many relationships in social life.
Yet in Aristotle too we find the yin-yang of communal and 
individualistic thinking, bearing in mind that the notion of 
individual rights was not highly developed in that era of 
history.28  Thus, subject to its regulation for the common good,29
Aristotle supports private property –- the essence of which is 
to empower the owner to choose with whom to associate with 
regard to the property’s use.30  And this for a variety of 
26 ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 6.
27 Id. at 7.
28 See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Bobbs Merrill 1962).  For Aristotle 
one’s ethical duties, i.e., how one should treat others, derive from the 
pursuit of one’s highest end, which is happiness, which comes about through 
the development of one’s excellences and virtues, which include the way one 
treats others.  See also THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE 1-24 (H. MacL. Currie, ed., 
J.M. Dent & Sons 1973)(discussing the roots of the idea of respect for the 
individual in periods of ancient Greek and Roman democracy and its maturation 
-- “the essential dignity and sanctity of human life, freedom of thought and 
criticism,…popular government…, the rule of law based on the impartial 
administration of justice,” at 5 -- in western civilization beginning with 
the Renaissance and Protestant Reformation).
29
 “It is clearly better that property should be private, but the use of it 
common; and the special business of the legislature is to create in men this 
benevolent disposition.”  ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 26.  “Clearly, then, the 
legislator ought not only to aim at the equalization of properties, but at 
moderation in their amount.” Id. at 34.  “The true forms of government, 
therefore, are those in which the one, or the few, or the many govern with a 
view to the common interest; but governments which rule with a view to the 
private interest, whether of the one, or of the few, or of the many, are 
perversions.” Id. at 61. 
30 See, e.g., Thomas Kleven, Private Property and Democratic Socialism, 21 LEG. 
STUD. FOR. 1, 12-21 (1997)(“Ownership confers decision making power over 
13
reasons with both collective and individualistic overtones.  
“When a man feels a thing to be his own,” this contributes to 
personal pleasure and thereby to the development of one’s 
excellence;31 and the greatest pleasure is “in doing a kindness 
or service…(to others), which can only be rendered when a man 
has private property.”32  And private property enables people to 
“set an example of liberality” or “liberal action,” deriving 
from “the use which is made of property.”33  And, finally, “there 
is much more quarreling among those who have all things in 
common,”34 such that with private property “men will not complain 
of one another, and they will make more progress, because 
everyone will be attending to his own business.”35
And, while people (alas only men to Aristotle) are 
naturally political animals, Aristotle acknowledges that “they 
things, the right to determine how things are to be used and who may have 
access to them, which in turn means that others who do not have the right to 
share therein, i.e., who are not co-owners, have the duty not to interfere 
with the owner’s control,” at 18); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of 
the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 
BUFF. L. REV. 325, 359 (1980)(“To say that one owned property was to say that 
the owner had some set of rights, privileges, powers and immunities.  
Moreover, one who did not own property had a set of no rights, duties, 
disabilities, and liabilities relative to the owner.”).  But compare State of 
New Jersey v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971)(overthrowing trespass 
conviction of field worker and attorney for organizations assisting migrant 
farm workers on ground that property owner does not have right to exclude 
them from visiting with workers in their on-premises living quarters so as to 
deny workers the “opportunity to enjoy associations customary among our 
citizens”).
31 ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 26.
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 27.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 26.
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are also brought together by their common interests,”36 implying 
that free choice is at play in establishing political 
relationships.  And, while Aristotle is not an unadulterated fan 
of democracy and sees advantages to other forms of government as 
well, he does note as among democracy’s virtues that “a man 
should live as he likes,”37 also implying freedom of choice in 
relationships.    
To conclude this part of the discussion, I do not propose 
to try to resolve here which of the foregoing perspectives, the 
individualistic or the communal, is the more correct or 
appropriate for addressing associational issues.  Indeed, the 
debate over that question is probably endless and unresolvable, 
and in the real world most or all societies have an ethos that 
incorporates some aspects of both approaches albeit with 
differing emphases in differing societies.  Therefore, we should 
expect to find societies resolving associational issues 
differently in keeping with the nuances of their mores.  And 
within societies we should expect to find associational issues 
resolved differently over time as their mores evolve.
C. The Institution of Marriage
To illustrate the point just made, let’s briefly look at 
the institution of marriage.  In the United States the 
establishment of a marital relationship is widely viewed as the 
36 Id. at 60.
37 Id. at 144.
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choice of the two parties, both of whom must agree and either 
one of whom may block its establishment.  In this context, the 
party who doesn’t want an association prevails over the party 
who does, and therefore controls the outcome.
Individualistic values underlie this arrangement.  To force 
someone to marry another against one’s will would be seen as a 
violation of human dignity and of the fundamental individual 
right to control one’s destiny with regard to such matters.  
This sentiment flows from cultural notions of what marriage 
entails.  The intimacy of marriage, ideally based on love and 
typically involving sexual relations, is one obvious element.  
More collective notions are also likely at play, such as the 
perceived importance of the nuclear family to society’s 
successful functioning and of the importance of marriage based 
on mutual choice to the success of the nuclear family.  
Underlying all these elements are debatable value and 
empirical judgments.  A society in which the extended family is 
a more important institution than the nuclear family might well 
see marriage based on love and the choice of the two parties as 
promoting the latter and undermining the former.  This may help 
explain the practice in some societies, perhaps more so in the 
past though still found today, of arranged marriages.38  It might 
38 See, e.g., GWEN J. BROUDE, MARRIAGE, FAMILY, AND RELATIONSHIPS 192-195 (ABC-CLIO 
1994)(comparing arranged marriage practices in various cultures); Xu Xiaohe & 
Martin King White, Love Matches and Arranged Marriages, in NEXT OF KIN 420 
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be thought that marriage based on intense interpersonal intimacy 
and mutual choice will weaken the ties to other members of and 
lead couples to separate themselves from an extended family; and 
that marriages arranged by one's family or parents, with the new 
couple perhaps living with one of their families as is often the 
case in societies with arranged marriages, will strengthen 
extended family ties.
No doubt arranged marriages have often taken into account 
the wishes of the parties.  When not, arranged marriage is an 
instance of an association that one or both of the parties may 
not want.  While ultimately it may be difficult to force an 
adamantly unwilling party to marry, various social pressures can 
be applied to induce compliance.  Threats of disinheritance and 
ostracism have frequently been used, even in societies as 
individualistic as the United States, to induce compliance with 
parental wishes, and in some societies even the killing of a
(Lorne Tepperman & Susannah J. Wilson, eds., Prentice Hall 1993)(comparing 
and contrasting arranged marriage practices in China and Japan).  For 
articles on recent efforts at reform in societies with historical traditions 
of patriarchal marital practices, including arranged marriage, see, e.g., 
Michele Brandt & Jeffrey A. Caplan, The Tension Between Women’s Rights and 
Religious Rights: Reservations to CEDAW by Egypt, Bangladesh and Tunisia, 12 
J. L. & RELIGION 105 (1995-96); Mark Cammack, Lawrence A. Young & Tim Heaton, 
Legislating Social Change in an Islamic Society - Indonesia’s Marriage Law, 
44 AM. J. COMP. L. 45 (1996); Anna M. Hann, Holding Up More Than Half the Sky: 
Marketization and the Status of Women in China, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEG. ISS. 791 
(2001); Shirley L. Wang, The Maturation of Gender Equality Into Customary 
International Law, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 899 (1995); Sherifa Zuhur, 
Empowering Women or Dislodging Sectarianism: Civil Marriage in Lebanon, 14 
YALE J. L. & FEM. 177 (2002).
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recalcitrant child has been condoned or accepted.39
While mutual choice is the prevailing approach to the 
establishment of a marriage in this society, the right to make 
that choice has been severely limited by requirements such as 
not already being married to someone else or not being of the 
same gender.  Such requirements reflect societal concerns, like 
promoting procreation or perceived moral offensiveness, that are 
thought to trump the value of individual choice even with regard 
to a matter as intimate as marriage.  For example, anti-polygamy 
laws might be justified as protecting women and children from 
perceived oppression or ensuring that there are potential 
partners for everyone who wants to marry; and banning same-sex 
marriage might be justified as promoting procreation or 
preventing practices that violate societal mores.  Nevertheless 
not only are there strong individual rights claims for allowing 
polygamy40 and same-sex marriage, but polygamy has been widely if 
39
 For reports on countries where “honor killings” of women for various 
reasons, including refusal to submit to arranged marriages, are common and on 
the indifference and complicity of the authorities, see, e.g. Amnesty 
International, Pakistan: Honor killings of girls and women, at http://www. 
amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/ASA330181999; Gendercide Watch, Case Study: Honor 
Killings and Blood Feuds, at http://www.gendercide.org/case_honour.html; 
Human Rights Watch, Violence Against Women and “Honor” Crimes, at http://www. 
hrw.org/press/2001/04/un_oral12_0405.htm.   
40 For divergent views regarding polygamy, see, e.g., Stephanie Forbes, Note, 
Why Have Just One?: An Evaluation of the Anti-Polygamy Laws under the 
Establishment Clause, 39 Hou. L. Rev. 1517 (2003)(arguing that laws banning 
polygamy violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment per 
promotion of particular religious views and absence of an overriding secular 
purpose); Keith E. Sealing, Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory and 
State Constitutional Provisions Against Polygamy Are Unconstitutional Under 
the Free Exercise Clause, 17 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 691 (2001)(arguing that anti-
polygamy laws intentionally discriminate against Mormons without a legitimate 
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diminishingly practiced in other societies and there are 
movements here and elsewhere to legitimize same-sex unions.41
Nor is the free choice model fully applicable to the 
termination of a marriage, i.e., divorce.  In some societies, 
including the United States in earlier times, divorce has been 
next to impossible to obtain even when both parties want it.42
secular purpose); Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance: 
Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 1501 (1997)(arguing 
that anti-polygamy laws are justifiable per the contribution of polygamy to 
despotic and inegalitarian societies and of monogamy to the modern liberal-
democratic state); Richard A. Vasquez, Note, The Practice of Polygamy: 
Legitimate Free Exercise of Religion or Legitimate Public Menace? Revisiting 
Reynolds in Light of Modern Constitutional Jurisprudence, 5 N.Y.U. J. Legis. 
& Pub. Pol. 225 (2001-2002)(arguing that harms of polygamy to women and 
children constitute a compelling government interest justifying its 
prohibition).
41 See, e.g., Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, ___ Mass. ___ 
(2003)(denial of benefits of civil marriage to same-sex partners infringes 
fundamental rights of individual liberty and equality in violation of 
Massachusetts Constitution); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 
1999)(exclusion of same sex couples from benefits and protections of marriage 
violates Common Benefits Clause of Vermont Constitution); Clifford Krauss, 
Gay Marriage Plan: Sign of Sweeping Social Change in Canada, New York Times, 
Section A, Page 8 (June 19, 2003)(reporting on Canada’s decision to legalize 
same-sex marriage).  For arguments in favor the right of same-sex marriage, 
see, e.g., Elvia R. Arriola, Law and the Family of Choice and Need, 35 
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 691 (1996-97); MARK STROSSER, LEGALLY WED 23-74 (Cornell 
University Press 1997)(arguing that bans on same sex marriages violate the 
equal protection and due process clauses); Cindy Tobisman, Marriage vs. 
Domestic Partnership: Will We Ever Protect Lesbians’ Families, 12 BERKELEY 
WOMEN’S L.J. 112 (1997).  For arguments against or counseling a gradual 
approach to the recognition of same-sex marriage, see, e.g., George W. Dent, 
Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15 J.L. & POL. 581 (1999); Linda S. 
Echols, The Marriage Mirage: The Personal and Social Identity Implications of 
Same-Gender Matrimony, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 353 (1999).
42
 Throughout most of Europe prior to the 1800s, largely influenced by 
religious doctrine proclaiming the indissolubility of marriage, divorce was 
virtually unknown and annulment very hard to obtain, such that couples who 
wanted out of marriage had to settle for living apart while remaining 
formally married.  Likewise in colonial America divorce was difficult to 
obtain and uncommon, especially in the South, although legislative divorces 
were occasionally granted.  After independence the situation in the South 
remained the same, while largely restrictive judicial divorce laws were 
developed in some Northern states.  By 1880 legislative divorce was dead and 
most states had general divorce laws of varying degrees of stringency.  See, 
e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 181-82, 436-40 (Simon & 
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Once divorce was generally allowed in the United States, it 
was ordinarily necessary to show cause, such as adultery, 
desertion or cruelty.43  This usually posed little problem when 
both parties wanted out, since they could stipulate to or 
fabricate cause.44  But a requirement of cause could pose a 
substantial obstacle when one party wanted out and the other 
didn’t.  In such instances the party wanting the association to 
continue controlled if the party not wanting it was unable to 
show cause.  True, the party wanting out might be able to 
physically leave so that the parties were no longer living 
together as a married couple, but the formality of the marriage 
and the attendant legal and even social obligations would still 
remain.
It is possible to reconcile the requirement of cause with 
the mutual choice model.  The choice to marry in the face of the 
cause requirement could be seen as akin to an agreement not to 
sever the association without cause.  This rationale would seem 
more convincing if the parties had a choice of marrying under a 
regime permitting unilateral divorce or under one requiring 
Schuster 1973); MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW 7-27 
(University of Chicago Press 1972)    
43
 Comprehensive divorce laws began to arise in the United States in the mid-
1800s.  Although initially a few states established fairly permissive grounds 
for divorce, by the late 1800s restrictive divorce laws were the norm.  See, 
e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 42, at 436-40; REINSTEIN, supra note 42, at 28-55; 
Walter Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REV. 32, 
35-44 (1966).
44 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 42, at 439 (“collusion was a way of life”); 
RHEINSTEIN, supra note 42, at 55-63; Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational 
Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 15-16 (1990).
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cause, as is currently being tried or considered in some 
states.45  When the only available option is divorce for cause, 
then society as a whole induces individuals who want the 
benefits of marriage to limit their ability to exit the 
relationship against the wishes of the other party, thereby 
empowering the party who wants the relationship to continue.
Currently in the United States it is fairly easy to sever a 
marital relationship through divorce, since most states either 
have no fault divorce or impose standards such as 
incompatibility or irreconcilable differences that are quite 
easily shown.46  Consequently, when one party wants a marriage to 
continue and the other wants out, the latter controls.  
However, although unilateral divorce is now fairly easy, 
society’s requirement of support for ex-spouses and of children 
impinges on one party’s ability to totally end all aspects of 
the relationship against the will of the other party.  Support 
45
 Both Arizona and Louisiana have recently adopted “covenant marriage” 
statutes enabling parties to choose to marry under a system requiring 
traditional fault grounds for divorce rather than the generally applicable 
no-fault system.  Ariz. Rev. Stat. s.25-901 et seq. (1998); La Rev. Stat. 
s.9:272-275, 307 (1997).  
46 See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 64-81 (Harvard University 
Press 1987)(identifying 18 states as having divorce on nonfault grounds only, 
2 as requiring mutual consent for nonfault divorce, and 30 states as having 
mixed fault and nonfault systems that impose various waiting periods for 
contested unilateral nonfault divorce; and comparing the United States to 
Western Europe where only Sweden has a totally nonfault system, Ireland 
prohibits divorce, and most countries have nonfault or mixed systems with 
waiting periods and/or judicial discretion to deny a contested unilateral 
nonfault divorce against a faultless party on hardship grounds); HERBERT JACOB, 
SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2, 43-103 (The 
University of Chicago Press 1988)(detailing the history of the no-fault 
movement in the United States); Wadlington, supra note 43, at 44-52 
(discussing the operation of divorce laws based on incompatibility). 
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requirements might be rationalized in a number of ways, 
involving both individualistic and collective concerns: on the 
basis of a party’s having voluntarily undertaken such 
obligations by virtue of choosing to marry or have children; or 
the perceived unfairness of allowing total exit when a less-
well-off spouse may have foregone opportunities for self-
sufficiency in the interest of the marital or family 
relationship; or a judgment that individuals should be 
responsible for providing for their offspring rather than 
leaving it entirely to the other parent or to society as a 
whole; or the contribution of support requirements to the 
preservation of the nuclear family as an integral societal 
institution.  In any event, support requirements depart at least 
to some degree from total freedom to exit an unwanted 
relationship that another party wants.  In fact, support 
requirements may be imposed even against the wishes of both 
parties to a divorce, as through laws requiring divorcees to 
reimburse the state for welfare benefits paid to ex-spouses and 
children.47
In sum, despite the intimacy of the marital relationship, 
this and other societies frequently intervene through law and 
social practice to prevent people who want to marry from doing 
so, and to compel or induce people who don’t want to marry or 
47 See Paul K. Legler, The Coming Revolution in Child Support Policy: 
Implications of the 1996 Welfare Act, 30 FAM. L.Q. 519 (1996).
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remain married to do so.  Both individualistic and collective 
considerations govern the institution of marriage, and different 
balances are struck among societies and within societies over 
time.
D. Associational Considerations Among Parties Within a Society
In this section I want to try to flesh out more thoroughly 
some of the considerations relevant to deciding who should 
control the existence or non-existence of associations among 
society’s members.48  Let’s assume a society deciding (i) whether 
to allow, prohibit or mandate particular relationships, and (ii) 
who should control the outcome in case of conflict over the 
existence or not of a relationship.  Every society so deciding 
will have a bias, deriving from its culture and mores and likely 
changing over time, of the relative significance to the decision 
of various individual and collective considerations.49  Yet 
48
 Like the concept of society, supra note 3, the concept of membership is 
complex and variable, depending on the emphasis placed on the various factors 
that might be thought relevant, such as formal citizenship, voluntarily 
joining and/or agreeing to be a member, presence in a society and/or 
participation in its activities.  Since members of a society frequently 
receive more favorable treatment than non-members, the issue of whether 
someone is a societal member may be hotly contested.  See infra, notes 115-16 
and accompanying text, re the lesser rights of prospective immigrants.  See 
also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)(equal protection clause applies to 
undocumented alien children present within a state such that the state must 
provide them free public education available to citizens and lawful aliens); 
Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983)(no equal protection violation for 
state to deny free public education to children residing in district for 
primary purpose of attending public school).
49
 In this society, for example, the presumption when the law is silent is 
that parties are free to mutually decide to have or not to have an 
association.  An alternative approach is possible, at least with respect to 
the establishment of an association, namely that all associations require 
prior collective approval.  That the former rather than the latter is the 
case reflects the individualistic bias of the society.
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although these biases will often produce different outcomes in 
similar associational contexts, the considerations that come 
into play may be the same.  
1. Terminating an Existing Relationship.  
Since individual freedom is so highly valued in this 
society, let’s assume a society in which interpersonal relations 
are ordinarily up to the parties involved,50 and in case of 
conflict that the party not wanting a relationship ordinarily 
controls, unless there are sufficient countervailing 
considerations either to socialize the decision or to empower 
the other party to control.  And let’s address first a party 
desiring to terminate an existing relationship that the party 
voluntarily entered into and that the other party wants to
continue.51
50
 Like the concepts of society and membership, what it means to say that 
someone is involved in a relationship is subject to a variety of 
interpretations depending on such factors as whether they have agreed to the 
relationship, their degree of interdependence with others, or their feeling 
or being affected by what others do.  Due to their common destiny, there is a 
sense in which everyone in the world is involved in a mutual relationship.  
Yet the extent of the relationship may have legal significance.  For example, 
laws requiring parental consent before a minor can obtain an abortion seem 
premised on the existence of a relationship with the child that warrants 
parental involvement in the decision, subject to the child’s right to opt out 
of that aspect of the parent-child relationship if the child can demonstrate 
sufficient maturity to a judge who thereby becomes involved in the decision 
as kind of a surrogate parent.  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  In contrast, holding that 
parents have the right to deny visitation privileges to grandparents seems 
premised on the absence of a sufficiently strong grandparent-child 
relationship to overcome the parent-child relationship.  Troxel v. Granville, 
530 U.S. 57 (2000).  See also infra, notes 115-16 and accompanying text, re 
the lesser rights of prospective immigrants as against those who are already 
societal members.
51
 Where one party wants out of an existing relationship and the other 
doesn’t, several resolutions are possible.  One is to allow unilateral 
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As noted above with regard to marriage, individualistic 
considerations do not necessarily support the right of a party 
wanting out always to have the absolute privilege to completely 
terminate an existing relationship against the will of the other 
party.  Suppose at the inception of a relationship the parties 
agree that the relationship may be terminated only by mutual 
agreement and that neither shall have the right to terminate it 
unilaterally.  If later one party wants out, the other who 
doesn’t might claim that the first party has voluntarily parted 
with whatever right it may otherwise have had not to have or 
continue an unwanted relationship.  To reject that claim it is 
necessary to treat the unilateral right to terminate an unwanted 
relationship as inalienable, thereby making the stipulation 
against unilateral termination void.  
termination, a second to allow unilateral termination but subject to the 
requirement that the party wanting out somehow compensate the other party, a 
third to allow the party wanting the relationship to continue to specifically 
enforce the agreement against unilateral termination, and a fourth to allow 
specific performance but subject to the requirement that the party wanting in 
somehow compensate the party wanting out.  (The possible resolutions are 
derived from the taxonomy of property and liability rules developed in the 
classic article, Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienabilty: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 
(1972)).  Only the first alternative fully satisfies the individualistic 
claim of an absolute privilege to terminate an unwanted relationship over the 
other party’s objection.  The second alternative is next most favorable to 
the party wanting out.  But it is inconsistent with an absolute privilege to 
terminate because having to compensate the other party impinges on the 
privilege and may at times be so costly as to induce someone to remain in an 
unwanted relationship; and also because it entails a concession to the party 
wanting a relationship to continue, empowers that party in bargaining over 
the relationship’s future, and requires that the relationship continue in the 
form of whatever the required compensation consists of.  Still this second 
alternative, as well as the third and fourth which are even more favorable to 
the party wanting in, are all consistent with an individualistic approach to 
social life.
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A commitment to individualism may at times support viewing
some individual rights as inalienable, as when parting with 
those rights would overly undermine what it means to be a person 
and pervert a commitment to individualism.52  For example, it 
might be claimed that people have an inalienable right to life 
and liberty, and thus that they should not be permitted to agree 
to allow others to kill or enslave them.53  But as the debate 
over physician assisted suicide shows, it is far from clear that 
a commitment to individualism supports making even these 
fundamental rights inalienable in all instances.54  It is even 
possible to claim that inalienability is inconsistent with a 
commitment to individualism, such that people should be free to 
part with all their individual rights,55 at least so long as they 
do so voluntarily and without coercion (assuming that to be a 
possible state of affairs –- a point to be developed more fully
52 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
1849 (1987)(arguing for the non-commodification of aspects of the self that 
are integral to personhood).
53 See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 95 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1975)(originally 
published in 1859)(“The principle of freedom cannot require that (someone) 
should be free not to be free.  It is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate 
(one’s) freedom.”).
54 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)(assistance for 
terminally ill patients in committing suicide not a fundamental liberty 
interest protected by due process clause); Raphael Cohen-Almagor & Monica G. 
Hartman, The Oregon Death With Dignity Act: Review and Proposals for 
Improvement, 27 J. LEG. 269 (2001); Neil M. Gorsuch, The Right to Assisted 
Suicide, and Euthenasia, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 599 (2000); Christine 
Naylon O’Brien, Gerald A. Madek & Gerald R. Fererra, Oregon’s Guidelines for 
Physician Assisted Suicide: A Legal and Ethical Analysis, 61 U. PITT. L. REV.
329 (2000); PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE (Robert F. Weir, ed., Indiana University 
Press 1997); Melvin I. Urofsky, Justifying Assisted Suicide: Comments on the 
Ongoing Debate, 14 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETH. & PUB. POL. 893 (2000).  
55 See, e.g. NOZICK, supra note 4, at 58, 331 (arguing that a free society must 
allow someone to consent to being killed or enslaved).
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below).56
The problem in the present context is that there are 
competing individual rights claims.  Not to allow unilateral 
withdrawal from a relationship does limit the freedom of the 
party wanting out, but allowing it also impacts the freedom of 
the party wanting in.  Thus the assertion that a party has the 
inalienable right to unilaterally and with impunity withdraw 
from any relationship, even after agreeing otherwise, must 
contend with the individual right claim of the party wanting the 
relationship to continue that to allow unilateral withdrawal 
would infringe its individual rights in light of the consequent 
harms the party might suffer after changing position and passing 
up other opportunities in reliance on the agreement.  It is not 
sufficient to rebut this claim to argue that the party wanting 
in has no legitimate claim of detrimental reliance because the 
party should realize at the outset that the right to withdraw is 
inalienable and thus freely assumes the risk of the other 
party’s unilateral withdrawal.  The issue is whether individual 
rights considerations support more the recognition of an 
inalienable right of unilateral termination or of a right to 
hold a party to an agreement not to unilaterally withdraw or at 
least to be compensated in the event thereof.
In such situations, i.e., when individual rights
56 See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
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considerations are implicated on both sides of an issue, which 
may often and perhaps always be the case, it must be decided 
which side’s interests are weightier.  This decision will 
frequently, if not always, require a contextual analysis of 
which side’s interests seem stronger under the circumstances.  
For example, the claim for a right to unilaterally withdraw from 
a marriage seems stronger when shortly after marrying one party 
wants out and the other stands to suffer no more perhaps than a 
brief emotional hurt, than when one party has sacrificed a 
career in order to assist the other party’s career and then 
years later after achieving success the other wants out and 
would leave the sacrificing party destitute.  At a minimum the 
sacrificing party would seem to have a strong claim for a right 
to receive support, i.e., compensation, from the party wanting 
out.
Now let’s assume that there is no agreement not to 
terminate, that the parties have voluntarily entered into a 
relationship without specifying either way whether there is a 
right of unilateral termination, and that now one party wants 
out and the other wants the relationship to continue.  Again, it 
must be decided which side’s interests are weightier in context.  
Let’s compare two situations: first two parties establish a 
friendship and later one wants to end it while the other wants 
it to continue; second, two parties mutually undertake some 
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joint economic venture and later one wants out.  In this society 
today the right to unilaterally terminate a friendship is the 
norm, whereas at times measures are taken to induce the 
continued existence of business relationships or at least to 
require compensation in the event of unilateral termination.57
The two situations cannot readily be distinguished on the 
basis of a friendship’s being inherently terminable at any 
party’s will in that it depends on an emotional commitment that 
cannot be imposed.  In fact, by forcing people to associate it 
may well be possible to induce emotional commitments that one or 
both parties would otherwise reject, as when master and slave or 
57
 For example, although courts have been unwilling to compel performance of 
personal service contracts, they will at times enjoin breaching parties such 
as entertainers and others with unique skills for working for competitors.  
See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts s.367 (1981); William Lynch 
Schaller, Jumping Ship: Legal Issues Relating to Employee Mobility in High 
Technology, 17 LAB. LAW. 25, 33-34 (2001).  Similarly, express and at times 
implied non-competition clauses and covenants not to disclose between 
employer and employee or in professional associations are enforced, subject 
to a reasonableness test that depends on whether there exists a legitimate 
protectable interest such as trade secrets or money invested in training or 
whether the purpose is simply to tie someone to the firm or the effect is to 
overly undermine mobility.  See, e.g. Rachael S. Arnow-Richmon, Bargaining 
for Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsideration of the Role of 
Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 1163 
(2001); Gillian Lester, Restrictive Covenants, Employee Training, and the 
Limits of Transaction-Cost Analysis, 76 IND. L.J. 49 (2001); Suellen Lowry, 
Inevitable Disclosure Trade Secret Disputes: Dissolutions of Concurrent 
Property Interests, 40 STAN. L. REV. 519 (1988); Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints 
on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383 (1993); Katherine V.W. 
Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of Human Capital in the 
Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721 (2002); Sela Stroud, Non-Compete 
Agreements: Weighing the Interests of Profession and Firm, 53 ALA. L. REV. 
1023 (2002).  When successful such actions, although not specifically 
requiring the continuation of a business relationship, may induce its 
continuance by preventing people who want out from establishing alternative 
relationships. 
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jailer and prisoner develop affection for one another.58  And a 
successful business relationship also requires a type of 
emotional commitment among its associates, a commitment that is 
in many ways every bit as intimate as in a friendship.59  Nor can 
the situations readily be distinguished by the contractual 
nature of the economic venture, or by the reliance and 
opportunity costs associated with it.  A friendship too is a 
type of agreement, ordinarily more tacit perhaps than the usual 
business relationship but nevertheless typically entailing a 
mutual commitment to respond to the other when asked and when 
able to do so.  And in reliance on that commitment, and to their 
detriment if the commitment is withdrawn, friends frequently 
change position and pass up other opportunities.
So perhaps what distinguishes friendship from business are 
collective considerations, like the centrality of business 
relations to the materialistic ethic that prevails in this 
society and the perceived dependence of the successful 
functioning of the economic system on binding contracts.  Absent 
58
 Re slavery, see, e.g., NATHAN IRVIN HUGGINS, BLACK ODYSSEY: THE AFRO-AMERICAN ORDEAL 
IN SLAVERY 114-53 (Pantheon Books 1977); KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: 
SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 322-31, 377-82 (Alfred A. Knopf 1956).  Re 
prisons, see, e.g., DANIEL GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 121-
22, 141-46 (Bobbs-Merrill 1964); GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY 
OF A MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON 54-55 (Princeton University Press 1958); HANS TOCH, 
LIVING IN PRISON: THE ECOLOGY OF SURVIVAL 260-62 (American Psychological Asso. 
1992).
59 See, e.g., W. EDWARDS DEMING, THE NEW ECONOMICS FOR INDUSTRY, GOVERNMENT, EDUCATION
28-29 (The MIT Press 2d ed. 2000)(emphasizing the importance to an 
enterprise’s success of “giv(ing) everyone a chance to take pride in his 
work,” “informal dialogue,” “comradeship,” “study-groups and social 
gatherings,” and generally developing a spirit of cooperation).
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such considerations, attempting to impose on people intimate 
relations like friendships might be thought to offend human 
dignity.  Yet a society is certainly conceivable where 
friendship is seen as so integral to its success that 
unilaterally terminating friendships, at least without good 
cause, is discouraged in various ways.60  Even in this highly 
individualistic society people are discouraged from cavalierly 
ending friendships unilaterally through social pressure, like a 
bad reputation making it difficult to establish friendships in 
the future.
2. Establishing an Initial Relationship  
So far the analysis has been skeptical of the right of a 
party not wanting an association to control the outcome in all 
instances, at least as regards an already existing relationship.  
Now let’s turn to the inception of a proposed association and 
consider in turn first one that both parties want and others 
60 See, e.g., Joan G. Miller, David M. Bersoff & Robin L. Harwood, Perceptions 
of Social Responsibilities in India and in the United States: Moral 
Imperatives or Personal Decisions, 58(1) J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCH. 33 
(1990)(finding that Indians tend to view responsibilities to others, 
especially to friends and strangers, more in terms of moral obligations, 
whereas Americans tend to view them as more a matter of personal choice); 
Niloufer Qasim Madhi, Pukhtunuali: Ostracism and Honor Among the Pathan Hill 
Tribes, 7(3/4) ETHOLOGY AND SOCIOBIOLOGY 295 (1986)(reporting on the practice of 
ostracism, including expulsion from the tribe, as means of deterring behavior 
contrary to tribal norms and of unifying the group); Paras Nath Singh, Sophia 
Chang Huang & George G. Thompson, A Comparative Study of Selected Attitudes, 
Values, and Personality Characteristics of American, Chinese, and Indian 
Students, 57 J. OF SOCIAL PSYCH. 123, 130 (1962)(“The American culture gives 
more emphasis to personal autonomy and individuality.  In contrast to this, 
Indian and Chinese students give more emphasis to sympathy, love, affection, 
mutual help and family bonding, resulting in sympathetic and sacrificing 
attitudes”). 
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find objectionable, then one that one party wants and the other 
doesn’t, and finally one that neither party wants while others 
do.
a. Relationships that Both Parties Want - When both parties 
want to have a relationship in a society favoring the individual 
right of free association, preventing them from doing so would 
seem clearly to violate their rights, absent at least overriding 
collective considerations.  Examples of such collective 
considerations are laws prohibiting conspiracies to overthrow 
the government or in restraint of trade.  In other instances, 
however, assertions of collective considerations may not suffice 
to overcome the value of free association.
Take the practice of the forced separation of the races, as 
with mandatory segregation in the United States and South 
African apartheid and as still practiced in some societies 
today.61  Forced separation imposes through the use of 
61 See, e.g., YAAKOV KOP & ROBERT E. LITAN, STICKING TOGETHER: THE ISRAELI EXPERIMENT IN 
PLURALISM 20-21, 30-34, 74-75, 86, 98 (Brookings Institution Press 2002) 
(discussing various government practices promoting the segregation of Arab 
Israelis and their separation from mainstream life -- the expropriation of 
Arab lands, confining Arabs in their own towns for two decades under military 
rule, the requirement of permits to leave their towns, restrictions on the 
sale of land to Arabs and the allocation of land on the basis of ethnicity, 
the denial of government jobs and the exclusion of Arabs from military 
service, separate schools for Arab children with Hebrew taught as a secondary
language -- and characterizing the situation as “separate but not equal”); 
BRENDAN MURTAGH, THE POLITICS OF TERRITORY: POLICY AND SEGREGATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND 34-
43, 47-49, 151, 163-67 (Palgrave 2002)(detailing extensive segregation in 
Northern Ireland along religious lines, but finding, despite the use of peace 
lines in Belfast to separate religious enclaves so as to avoid conflict, a 
lack of evidence to support the use of planning instruments to achieve ethno-
political objectives and characterizing government policy more as one of 
“benign acceptance” of separation than of design); Tracy Wilkinson, Bosnia’s 
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governmental power the preferences of those who don’t want 
interethnic relationships on those who do.  In the United 
States, for example, anti-miscegenation laws and laws mandating 
school and residential segregation prevented those blacks and 
whites who wanted to marry or go to school or live together from 
choosing to have those associations.62
In support of laws against race mixing might be asserted 
the right of groups to preserve their ethnic purity, which might 
become watered down over time if their members were allowed to 
cross the line.  Evaluating the merit of the ethnic purity 
argument ultimately demands a value judgment about which there 
Ethnic Division Relocates to the Classroom, Los Angeles Times, October 19, 
1997, at 1 (reporting on the segregation of students in schools in the 
Muslim-Croat Federation with “separate-but-equal” programs for Bosniak Muslim 
and Roman Catholic Croatian children). 
62
 Re interracial marriage, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) 
(prohibition against interracial marriage constitutes invidious 
discrimination based on race with respect to a fundamental individual liberty 
and therefore violates equal protection clause).  Re residential segregation, 
see Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917)(city ordinance prohibiting both 
blacks and whites from living in neighborhoods where other race is in the 
majority violates equal protection clause); Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 
(1927)(city ordinance prohibiting both blacks and whites from living in 
neighborhoods where other race is in the majority, except with consent of 
majority of other race, violates equal protection clause); Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)(judicial enforcement of racially restrictive 
covenants in deeds constitutes discriminatory state action in violation of 
equal protection clause).  Re schools, see Brown v. Board of Education, 347 
U.S. 483 (1954)(mandatory segregation of the races in public schools violates 
equal protection clause).  Compare Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral 
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959)(viewing the 
issue posed by enforced segregation as one of “denying the association to 
those individuals who wish it and imposing it on those who would avoid it,” 
and opining that there is no neutral constitutional basis for favoring one 
claim over the other); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 57 (Yale University Press 1986, 2d. ed.)(replying to 
Wechsler: “What on the score of generality and neutrality, is wrong with the 
principle that the legislative choice in favor of a freedom not to associate 
is forbidden, when the consequence of such a choice is to place one of the 
groups of which our society is constituted in a position of permanent, 
humiliating inferiority).”
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may be disagreement.  To some the pursuit of ethnic purity 
amounts to racism, whereas to believers it represents ethnic 
pride and group solidarity.  In the United States today, judging 
the worth of people on the basis of race is generally perceived 
as wrong and as contrary to society’s ethos that people are to 
be judged on their individual merits, i.e., by their character 
and actions,63 and especially so when the government makes
invidious race distinctions.64  While in keeping with the 
society’s individualistic ethic people may be entitled to their 
personal prejudices and even to practice them to some extent, 
they are not to use the government as a means of imposing their 
views and practices on society as a whole.  So if some community 
should attempt to reinstate the forced separation of the races 
for the purpose of preserving ethnic purity, even if supported 
63
 As most eloquently expressed by Martin Luther King in his “I Have A Dream” 
speech: “I have a dream that my four children will one day live in a nation 
where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content 
of their character.”  At http://www.mecca.org/~crights/dream.html.  
64 Loving, supra note 62.  The debate over the permissibility of affirmative 
action, see infra note 68, ultimately turns on one’s view of whether all race 
distinctions are inherently invidious (or at least presumptively so), in that 
affirmative action amounts to impermissible discrimination against whites by 
denying them benefits based on race rather than judging them on their merits, 
or whether race distinctions are more permissible when the purpose is benign 
and seeks to eradicate the effects of racial oppression.  See Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)(affirmative action in letting 
of government contracts must be judged under strict scrutiny standard); id. 
at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment): “In my 
view, government can never have a ‘compelling interest’ in discriminating on 
the basis of race to ‘make up’ for past racial discrimination in the opposite 
direction”; id. at 240, 241 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment): “(G)overnment sponsored racial discrimination based on benign 
prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious 
prejudice”; id. at 242, 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting): “There is no moral or 
constitutional equivalence between a policy that is designed to perpetuate a 
caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination.”
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by a majority of both blacks and whites, that would be 
unacceptable today because so clearly violative of society’s 
prevailing ethic.  Nevertheless, a society is conceivable, and 
some may exist today, where the preservation of the group is 
seen as more important than the rights of individual members.65
b. Relationships that One Party Wants - Now let’s turn to 
associations that one party wants and another doesn’t, and let’s 
examine the appropriateness of forcing relationships on the 
unwanting party in a society that generally favors free choice.66
65
 As reflected in the past generation in an intensification of ethnic 
conflict and an increased division of groups of people along ethic lines in 
several parts of the world: the partition of colonial India into largely 
Hindu India and largely Muslim Pakistan, the creation of Israel as a 
religious state primarily for Jews and the resultant struggle for the 
establishment of a Palestinian state, the civil war in Lebanon between Arab 
Christians and Muslims, the Hutu genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda, the break-
up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia into more ethnically homogeneous 
states.  See, e.g., SUZANNE MICHELE BIRGERSON, AFTER THE BREAKUP OF A MULTI-ETHNIC 
EMPIRE: RUSSIA, SUCCESSOR STATES, AND EURASIAN SECURITY (Praeger 2002); NOEL MALCOLM, 
BOSNIA: A SHORT HISTORY (MacMillan 1994); GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF 
A GENOCIDE (Columbia University Press 1998); EDWARD W. SAID, THE POLITICS OF 
DISPOSSESSION: THE STRUGGLE FOR PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION, 1969-1994 (Pantheon 
Books 1994); KAMAL SALIBI, A HOUSE OF MANY MANSIONS: THE HISTORY OF LEBANON RECONSIDERED
(I.B. Taurus & Co. 1988); IAN TALBOT, INDIA AND PAKISTAN (Oxford University Press 
2000); YUGOSLAVIA AND AFTER 87-115, 138-154, 196-212, 232-247 (David A. Dyker & 
Ivan Vejvoda, eds., Longman 1996).  In many of these areas the now divided 
groups, while maintaining ethnic identity and varying degrees of insularity, 
intermingled and interacted for many years in relative harmony.  Various 
historical factors, not all yet fully examined, may have contributed to the 
recent ethnic division: historical ethnic identification and nationalism; the 
exploitation of ethnic differences for their own ends by colonial powers or 
indigenous actors; the imposition of nation states from without rather than 
spontaneous development from within; the collapse of or failure to develop 
unifying structures; population growth and scarcity of resources; the uneven 
development of and increasing disparities among and within various regions of 
the world.  That the entire situation may be socially constructed does not 
make the ethnic divisions and the emphasis on the group any less real, just 
less endemic and more readily subject to change under different (shall we say 
more humane) social conditions.        
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 Here the obverse of the four alternatives discussed above, see supra note 
48, would be first to allow the party wanting a relationship to impose it on 
the unwanting party, second to allow the relationship to be imposed but 
require the party wanting the relationship to compensate the unwanting party, 
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As with already existing relationships, an initial problem as 
regards the initiation of a relationship when the parties are 
not in agreement is that there are parallel individual rights 
claims.  Allowing someone to impose a relationship impinges on 
the freedom of the party not wanting it, whereas enabling a 
party not wanting a relationship to avoid it impacts the freedom 
of the party wanting in.  So, again, a balancing of interests is 
required.  Here, however, the detrimental reliance argument of 
the party wanting in is unavailing, since it turns on the 
existence of an agreement that induces the reliance.  Thus the 
individual right claim of a party involved in a long term 
marriage, that the other party should not be able with impunity 
always to unilaterally terminate the relationship, seems 
stronger than the claim that the party wanting in should be able 
to force an unwanted marriage on another party in the first 
instance.
In other contexts, however, there may be sufficient reasons 
for empowering one party to initiate an unwanted relationship 
third to allow the unwanting party to avoid the relationship but require 
compensation to the party wanting the relationship, and fourth to allow the 
unwanting party to avoid the relationship entirely.  Only the last 
alternative fully favors the party not wanting the relationship, whereas the 
first three all concede something to the party wanting the relationship.  
Even the third alternative, which of the first three is least favorable to 
the party wanting the relationship, imposes a relationship on the unwanting 
party, since requiring the unwanting party to compensate the other party is 
in itself a type of relationship.  And it is inconsistent with an absolute 
privilege to avoid an unwanted relationship, since having to compensate 
strengthens the bargaining position of the party wanting in and may induce 
the unwanting party to establish a relationship that would otherwise not come 
about.
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with another.  To illustrate, let’s revert to the race relations 
example and examine possible scenarios once the mandatory 
separation of the races has been outlawed.  Let’s first assume 
that whites prefer segregation while blacks prefer integration, 
or in other words that blacks want a relationship that whites 
don’t.67  One context might be the desire of blacks for access to 
public employment or colleges previously reserved for whites.  
Integration might come about once public institutions begin to 
operate on a color blind basis and apply the same hiring and 
admissions criteria to both blacks and whites.68
67
 There has always been a divergence of opinion within and between the black 
and white communities over the desirability of integration versus separation.  
See infra notes 95, 98 and 102.  Historically, the leadership of the black 
community has also been diverse, with some like Martin Luther King and 
Thurgood Marshall pushing for integration, while others like Marcus Garvey 
and Malcolm X being more nationalistic.  See, e.g., ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, MARTIN LUTHER 
KING, JR. University of Georgia Press 1995); WILLIAM L. VAN DEBURG, MODERN BLACK 
NATIONALISM: FROM MARCUS GARVEY TO LOUIS FARRAKHAN (New York University Press 1997); 
JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY (Times Books 1998). 
68
 Or achieving integration in public institutions may require affirmative 
action that sets aside positions for blacks or at least takes race into 
account in ways that promote integration.  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 
S.Ct. 2325 (2003)(public law school may consider race or ethnicity as a 
factor in admissions process per compelling interest in attaining diverse 
student body provided it does not set aside slots or establish quotas for 
minority applicants and employs same general standards to all applicants); 
Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2411 (2003)(public university’s consideration 
of race in admissions process not narrowly tailored to achieve compelling 
interest in diversity per awarding all minority candidates a bonus without 
making individualized determination of merit and per effect of bonus in 
making race the decisive factor such that amounts to virtual set-aside).  See 
supra note 64.  One possible justification for affirmative action in this 
context is that without it the advantage that whites have as a result of past 
racism that failed to judge blacks on their merits would become entrenched, 
and that rectification is needed to counteract that advantage.  See, e.g. 
Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993).  
Another is that merely prohibiting discrimination against blacks is 
insufficient in practice to assure judgments based on merit because the 
lingering racism of the past is difficult to prove and often operates on a 
subconscious or unconscious level even when people think they are and may 
appear to be judging based on merit.  See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, 
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One response to whites who object to integration in this 
context is that the relationship is not forced since they have 
willingly entered into it by accepting public employment or 
choosing to attend public colleges.  But since public 
institutions may as a practical matter be the only viable 
options for many people, there is a sense in which the 
relationship is less than fully voluntary.  So a stronger 
response, even acknowledging a degree of forced association, is 
that to satisfy white preferences for non-integration would 
require the government to reinstate mandatory segregation in 
violation of its obligation to treat people as equals and not 
discriminate against them on the basis of race.
Now let’s move from the public to the private arena and 
assume that various entities (schools, clubs, professional 
associations, political parties, housing, public accommodations, 
and the like) are discriminating against blacks in accordance 
with the preferences of their white clientele.  And let’s assume 
that laws are proposed to ban those practices, and that whites 
object that such laws would violate their freedom of association 
by forcing them to associate with blacks.  They might assert 
further that in a society valuing individual freedom people must 
be allowed the latitude to hold and put into practice beliefs 
that may be offensive to others, so long at least as they 
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. 
REV. 317 (1987).
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function in the private spheres of social life and do not 
attempt to use the power of government to impose their beliefs 
on others who are then equally free to practice their beliefs.
But as strong as may be these claims in the abstract, in context 
there are strong individual rights considerations to the 
contrary.  First, the equal freedom argument is strongest when 
in practice there is genuine mutuality, and becomes weaker when 
there isn’t and when the exercise of their freedoms by some 
adversely affects the ability of others to exercise theirs.  For 
example, the mutuality argument seems quite strong with regard 
to people’s sexual preferences, particularly when they are 
practiced in the privacy of one’s home so that others are not 
forcibly exposed to them and remain free to similarly pursue 
their own sexual preferences.69  But the mutuality argument 
collapses in a society where whites control the means of 
achieving success in life and use that control to maintain their 
dominance by denying access to others.  As against the 
individual freedom to choose with whom and with whom not to 
69 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003)(state statute 
criminalizing sexual conduct between persons of the same sex violates rights 
of liberty and privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment). Lawrence
overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)(sodomy statute as applied 
to consensual sex between gay men in bedroom of home does not violate 
fundamental right of privacy).  Compare id. at 199, 213 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting): “This case involves no real interference with the rights of 
others, for the mere knowledge that other individuals do not adhere to one’s 
value system cannot be a legally cognizable interest,… let alone an interest 
that can justify invading the houses, hearts, and minds of citizens who 
choose to live their lives differently.”
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associate must be counterbalanced the value of the individual 
right to equal opportunity, which is also a prominent ethic in 
this society and which may at times outweigh associational 
considerations.70
Second, and related, the free association argument is 
stronger the more private the context and weaker the more 
public.  The free association claim asserts the right to do in 
private that which the government itself could not legitimately 
do or mandate, i.e., the right to act on one’s racial prejudices 
in ways that would violate people’s individual right not to be 
discriminated against on the basis of race if the government 
were involved.  A society with a strong individualistic ethic 
needs a distinction between the public and the private spheres 
of social life, since if everything were viewed as public there 
would be little or nothing left of individual freedom.71  But the 
distinction between the public and the private is often blurry.  
For example, white dominance in this society in the nominally 
70 See Brown, supra note 62, at 493: “In these days, it is doubtful that any 
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the 
opportunity of an education.  Such an opportunity, where the state has 
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on 
equal terms.” 
71 See Kleven, supra note 30, at 12-21 (“(A) democratic society in which 
people have no rights as individuals and groups, but only as members of 
society at large,… would be an undesirable state of affairs… because 
individuals and groups do have legitimate interests which any society worthy 
of being called democratic must recognize and accord”, at 20-21); Robert H. 
Mnookin, The Public/Private Distinction: Political Disagreement and Academic 
Repudiation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1429 (1982)(discussing the distinction between 
public and private spheres as a means of identifying when government 
regulation is and is not justified, and academic critiques of the 
meaningfulness of the distinction).
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private spheres of social life is to a great extent a by-product 
of past racist action on the part of the government.72
Furthermore, when racist practices in the nominally private 
spheres of social life become widespread, they take on a public 
character.  There is little practical difference, for instance, 
between a law prohibiting blacks from living in white 
neighborhoods and the widespread practice of whites refusing to 
sell or rent to blacks.73
72 See, e.g., Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political 
Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1849-57, 1860-78 (1994) 
(arguing in a society with a history of government fostered racism and which 
has since reformed, eliminating legal support for discrimination and even 
racist thinking but leaving behind the vestiges of its former racism, that 
“even in the absence of racism, race-neutral policy could be expected to 
entrench segregation and socio-economic stratification in a society with a 
history of racism,” at 1852; and arguing that the formally race-neutral 
structure and practice of local government have done just that in the U.S.); 
Harris, supra note 68, at 1715-21, 1737-57 (discussing slavery, segregation, 
and the racialization of the law in general in the United States); KENNETH T. 
JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 195-203, 207-218, 
225-30 (Oxford University Press 1985)(discussing the development of the 
practice of “redlining” black and poorer neighborhoods by the New Deal Era’s 
Home Owners Loan Corporation and the  subsequent adoption of the practice by 
private lenders, the participation of the Federal Housing Authority in 
contributing to and promoting segregated housing patterns in the post Second 
World War suburbanization of the United States while the central city areas 
where many blacks lived deteriorated, and the contribution of the federal 
government’s public housing program to the creation of urban ghettoes through 
granting suburban communities the discretion to reject public housing and 
allowing cities that accepted it to concentrate public housing in the poorest 
neighborhoods); DESMOND KING, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: BLACK AMERICANS AND THE US FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT (Clarendon Press 1995)(detailing the history of the U.S. 
government’s involvement in fostering segregation of its workers and in 
federal programs through the mid 20th century, which “could not help but 
define in part the character of the American polity and ensure unequal 
treatment for Black American employees,” at 16).
73 Compare Buchanan and Harmon, supra note 62, which struck down city 
ordinances mandating racially separate neighborhoods, and Shelley, supra note 
62, which invalidated judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants.  
In fact, racially restrictive covenants are still a valid means of 
maintaining neighborhoods’ ethnic purity, so long as they are informally 
adhered to and there is no outright refusal to sell to someone on account of 
race.  See id., at 13 (“So long as the purposes of (the restrictive) 
agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, it would 
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So the balance as between the individualistic values of 
free association, non-discrimination and equal opportunity 
depends on context and scope.  To illustrate, let’s compare race 
and religion.  The freedom to practice one’s religion is 
protected in the United States because historically, due to the 
sensitivity of religious beliefs and their centrality to 
people’s world views, societies’ dominant religions have often 
used the power of government to oppress minority religions and 
advance their religious views.74  This is inconsistent with all 
of the above values.  So the purpose of protecting free exercise 
is to assure all religious groups an equal opportunity to 
associate freely and without discrimination in order to pursue 
their religions, even though some of their beliefs and practices 
may be quite reprehensible to others.75  Furthermore, to ensure 
its neutrality as between differing religious and other world 
views, the government may not promote one religion over others 
appear clear that there has been no action by the State and the provisions of 
the (Fourteenth) Amendment have not been violated”); and Jones v. Alfred H. 
Mayers, 392 U.S. 409 (1968)(Civil Rights Act of 1866 bars private 
discrimination based on race in the sale or rental of property).    
74 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2502 (2002)(Justice 
Breyer’s dissent from Court’s decision upholding parents’ use of government 
funded school vouchers to enroll children in religious schools).
75 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)(free exercise rights of 
Amish entitle parents to remove Amish children from school after eighth grade 
and raise them in Amish life style without violating state’s compulsory 
attendance law).  But compare Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village 
School v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994)(violates establishment clause for state 
to create special school district for religious group, overriding religion’s 
free exercise claims); State of Oregon v. City of Rajneeshpuram, 598 F. Supp. 
1208 (D.Or. 1984)(violates establishment clause for state to allow 
incorporation of city completely controlled by religious organization, 
overriding religion’s free exercise claims).
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nor religion in general.76  However, this separation between 
church and state does not prevent government, in order to 
promote the common good, from intervening in religious affairs 
when their practices contravene important secular values77 or 
from incidentally benefiting religion in the furtherance of 
legitimate secular objectives.78  So the overall picture is of a 
society where people in their private spheres of association 
enjoy a relative autonomy from the greater society, the degree 
of which autonomy fluctuates as their actions are perceived as 
more or less of public moment. 
Analogously in the racial context, on the one hand we have 
whites who prefer to be with whites asserting the right to 
associate so as to practice beliefs that others find 
objectionable and to exclude blacks in order to do so, much like 
a religious group might confine membership to believers.  On the 
76 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987)(statute forbidding 
teaching of evolution unless accompanied by creationism violates 
establishment clause per purpose of promoting particular religious belief); 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 466 U.S. 924 (1984)(statute authorizing period of silence 
in public schools for meditation or voluntary prayer impermissibly endorses 
religion in violation of establishment clause); Abington School Dist. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)(statute requiring Bible reading at beginning of 
school day violates establishment clause); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 
(1962)(same re state prescribed non-sectarian prayer).
77 See, e.g., Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872 (1990)(denial of unemployment benefits re firing for cause for 
use of peyote, a prohibited controlled substance, does not violate free 
exercise rights of Native Americans who use peyote in religious rituals); 
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)(upholding against free exercise 
claim prosecution of parent for violation of child labor laws re use of child 
to distribute and sell religious literature).
78 See, e.g. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S.Ct. 2460 (2002)(state provision 
of educational vouchers used by parents to enroll children in religious 
schools does not violate establishment clause per secular purpose of 
improving educational opportunities and freedom of parents to select schools 
of their choice).
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other hand, we have the fundamental secular value that people 
should not be discriminated against on account of race.  This 
value is as central to people’s humanity as is the sanctity of 
their religious beliefs, and the need to protect it also arises 
from a history of oppression.  If society is to accommodate both 
of these fundamental individual interests, then racial 
exclusivity is more acceptable the narrower and more private its 
scope and less so the more it spills into the public arena and 
perpetuates historical oppression.  Thus the case for racial 
exclusivity is far weaker, for example, for a political party or 
professional association than for a genuinely private club,79 and 
is stronger when the preference for racial separation is mutual 
and leaves avenues for those who prefer integration than when it 
undermines equal opportunity.80
79 Compare Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)(nominally private white voters’ 
association’s pre-primary selection of candidates, where primary and general 
elections ratify those selections, violates Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition 
against state abridgement of the right to vote on account of race per state 
entanglement in process) and Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)(same re 
exclusion of blacks from Democratic Party’s primary elections), with Moose 
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)(no state action in violation of 
equal protection clause re granting of liquor license to private club that 
excludes blacks).
80
 A balancing test that takes into account the extent to which assertions of 
free association, if protected, would perpetuate historical oppression or 
undermine equal opportunity, as against the extent of the impact on 
associational interests of requiring unwanted associations, might help 
explain the divergent results in a series of Supreme Court cases dealing with 
exclusion based on race, gender and sexual orientation.  Compare  Runyon v. 
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)(application of  federal non-discrimination 
statute to prohibit private, commercially operated, non-sectarian school from 
denying admission based on race does not violate free association rights of 
school or parents per government’s overriding interest in eliminating 
incidents of slavery and per school’s presumed right to promote in its 
curriculum the desirability of racial segregation) and Roberts v. U.S. 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 1 (1984)(state requirement pursuant to statute prohibiting 
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To illustrate this point further, suppose that in the name 
of promoting ethnic identity people of a common ethnic heritage 
congregate in a particular locale, and even take steps to 
preserve the ethnic character of the area and to prevent others 
from living there.81  And let’s consider two scenarios.  In the 
first, while some people separate along ethnic lines others do 
not, such that there are ample communities available for people 
preferring ethnic homogeneity and for those preferring 
diversity.  In the second, the vast majority of the major ethnic 
group in a society separate themselves, leaving those in the 
minority who prefer diversity no choice but to live in a 
minority community.
discrimination on basis of sex in places of public accommodation that 
Jaycees, a non-profit corporation that promotes young men’s civic 
organization, admit women as members does not violate male members’ freedom 
of intimate or expressive association per insufficient intimacy of the 
relationship involved and state’s compelling interest in assuring equal 
access to public goods and services and in combating the stereotyping of 
women in ways that undermine individual dignity and deny equal opportunity to 
participate in political, economic and cultural life); with Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 
(1995)(application of state public accommodations law prohibiting 
discrimination on basis of sexual orientation so as to bar organizers of St. 
Patrick’s Day parade from disallowing Group to march as a group and to carry 
banner stating its purpose, although allowing members of group to participate 
as individuals, violates organizers First Amendment right of expressive 
association by requiring inclusion of disfavored message) and Boy Scouts of 
America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (application of state public 
accommodations law to prohibit Boy Scouts from expelling scout master who 
publicly declared his homosexuality, which Boy Scouts claimed contravened the 
values it seeks to promote, violates First Amendment right of expressive 
association by significantly burdening its ability promote those values).  Or 
does the diversity of the results reflect less sensitivity to the interests 
of gays than of women and ethnic minorities?
81
 One approach might be the use of restrictive covenants limiting residency 
to members of that ethnic group (see Shelley, supra notes 62 & 73); another 
might be the acquisition of a large tract of land to be collectively owned 
and occupied by an organization whose membership is limited to that ethnic 
group (see City of Rajneeshpuram, supra note 75.)
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The first scenario seems less problematic than the second.  
In the first, while some people may be deprived of the 
opportunity to enter some communities due to their ethnicity --
for instance people who disapprove of voluntary segregation and 
want into communities of a different ethnicity in order to 
promote integration -- there are still available communities 
that meet their associational preferences; whereas empowering 
them to force their way into the unavailable communities would 
undermine the associational preferences of those living there.  
In the second scenario, on the other hand, the associational 
preferences of most or all of the major ethnic group are met 
while the preferences of many minorities are not.  And by virtue 
of being deprived of the opportunity to associate with the 
majority, minorities may also be deprived of comparable life 
chances because, say, there is more money and therefore better 
education in majority communities, or because the majority have 
access in their communities to information and contacts that are 
unavailable in minority communities and are integral to success 
in life.82  If so, that would contribute to the majority’s 
perpetual dominance within the society as a whole, and thus 
strengthen the minority claim for being empowered to force an 
unwanted relationship on the majority. 
82 See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)(law school segregated by 
law violates equal protection clause)(“The law school, the proving ground for 
legal training and practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the 
individuals and institutions with which the law interacts”). 
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c. Relationships that Neither Party Wants - Finally, let’s 
consider proposed associations that none of the parties want.  
As with associations that both parties want, in a society 
generally favoring free choice the presumption would ordinarily 
be that the parties control when they are in agreement, unless 
there are overriding collective considerations.  To illustrate, 
let’s continue with the example of race relations and examine 
the appropriateness of imposing integration on blacks and whites 
when neither want it and both prefer separation.
Suppose, for example, following mandatory segregation that 
race conscious desegregation plans, including such measures as 
forced busing, are proposed for the purpose of promoting 
integration in public schools.83  And suppose that both black and 
white parents oppose the plans, and prefer a freedom of choice 
approach that would enable parents to select the schools their 
children attend.  And suppose that if implemented the freedom of 
choice approach would result in substantially segregated 
schools.84
Both black and white parents might argue for freedom of 
choice on grounds of free association, so that everyone can 
83 See Swann v. Charlotte Mechlenburg Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) 
(upholding forced busing as desegregation remedy in formerly de jure 
segregated system). 
84 See Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 
(1968)(overthrowing freedom of choice desegregation plan in formerly de jure 
segregated system containing only two schools where all whites and 85% of 
blacks chose to attend former segregated schools).
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decide for themselves with whom to attend school.  They might 
also assert that just as mandatory segregation violates people’s 
rights by preventing associations they want, so conversely do 
integration plans that force people who don’t want to associate 
with each other to do so.85
One possible response is that a major purpose of public 
education is to help build a cohesive society through the 
development of widely shared basic values, like tolerance and 
understanding, that promote the cooperative behavior necessary 
for society to thrive as well as the respect for others that a 
society valuing individual freedom demands.86  So it might be 
85
 People may be forced together under non-race-conscious as well as race-
conscious desegregation plans.  For example, rather than freedom of choice or 
forced busing, a neighborhood school approach might be implemented and might 
force people who don’t want to associate for racial or other reasons to be 
together.  (Indeed, where education is compulsory, even freedom of choice may 
force some to attend schools with others with whom they don’t want to 
associate.)  But a race-neutral neighborhood school approach that forces 
unwanting parties together might be thought preferable to a freedom of choice 
plan likely to result in a dispersal of students throughout a school district 
in that neighborhood schools enable greater parental involvement and expend 
less time and money on transportation, all of which may produce better 
educational outcomes.  Assuming that individual rights claims do not always 
on principle trump collective considerations, relevant questions might be 
whether the evidence really supports the asserted collective concerns 
(bearing in mind that at times collective considerations are speculative and 
may require a period of experimentation to see if in fact they pan out), and 
whether some types of collective considerations are on principle weightier 
than others when balanced against individual rights claims.  For example, 
when stacked up against the freedom to associate, the benefits to society of 
reduced racial prejudice or of better educational performance might be 
thought weightier than efficiency considerations such as increased costs, 
although at some level the cost of protecting some individual rights might 
impinge on the ability to promote others or might become prohibitive as a 
practical matter.
86 See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 94-116 (Macmillan 1926)(developing 
“a democratic conception of education“); AMY GUTMAN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 41-47 
(Princeton Univ. Press 1987)(discussing and favoring a “democratic state of 
education” where “all citizens must be educated so as to have a chance to 
share in self-consciously shaping the structure of their society,” at 46, and 
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claimed that society is better off in the long run when people 
are forced to integrate against their wishes in that forced 
integration reduces racial prejudice, thereby reducing the 
social turmoil that results therefrom and enhancing productivity 
through a greater willingness of people of different races to 
work cooperatively together. 
A second response has to do with the way in which 
preferences are formed.  Looked at from the perspective of the 
current moment, it does appear that forced integration negates 
the preferences of those who prefer separation.  But preferences 
develop over time, are the result of exposure and conditioning, 
can change over time and under different conditions, and might 
well be different in the present had past exposure and 
conditioning been otherwise.87  So it might be claimed that the 
current separatist preferences of both blacks and whites are the 
by-product in the United States of a history of past racism and 
of government participation therein, and that the very same 
that to accomplish this end must “aid children in developing the capacity to 
understand and to evaluate competing conceptions of the good life and the 
good society,” at 44, and must “use education to inculcate those character 
traits, such as honesty, religious toleration, and mutual respect for 
persons, that serve as foundations for rational deliberation of differing 
ways of life,” at 44).
87 Compare, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF 
TASTE 468 (tr., Richard Nice, Harvard University Press 1984)(a study of how 
social life conditions people’s tastes (read preferences): “The cognitive 
structures which social agents implement in the practical knowledge of the 
social world are internalized, ‘embodied’ social structures.  The practical 
knowledge of the social world that is presupposed by ‘reasonable’ behavior 
within it implements classificatory schemes…, historical schemes of 
perception and appreciation which are the product of the objective division 
into classes (age groups, genders, social classes) and which function below 
the level of consciousness and discourse”).
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people who currently prefer separation might prefer integration 
had history been otherwise.  In a sense, then, current 
separatist preferences may be imposed rather than freely chosen, 
or at least so highly conditioned as to be virtually 
involuntary, and it might be claimed that at least a period of 
forced integration is needed so as to counteract past 
conditioning and put people in a position to more freely choose 
whether to integrate or separate.88  From this more long-term 
perspective forced integration does not derogate from but 
actually promotes freedom of association.
This point is particularly significant in the case of young 
children who may be thought not yet capable of freely choosing 
with whom to associate or not, and who due to their tender age 
may be especially susceptible to being conditioned by their 
parents.  This poses a possible conflict between the individual 
rights of children and of parents, and raises the question of 
whether parents have the individual right to raise their 
children as they see fit even though that might derogate from 
88 See, e.g., GROUPS IN CONTACT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DESEGREGATION (Norman Miller & 
Marjorie B. Brewer, eds., Academic Press 1984)(containing studies in various 
societies and contexts of the conditions under which the “contact 
hypothesis”, which posits that “one’s behavior and attitudes toward members 
of a disliked social category will become more positive after direct 
interpersonal interaction with them,” at 2, holds true; identifying such 
factors as contact under egalitarian circumstances that minimize preexisting 
status differentials and enable cooperative behavior involving mutual 
interdependence and intimate interpersonal associations; but noting the 
absence of studies of the carryover of improved inter-ethnic relations in 
structured environments like schools to every-day life, at 6).  
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their children’s individual rights.89  An associational issue is 
at stake here because the claimed parental prerogative to 
control children’s upbringing asserts the right to impose on 
children a relationship they might not choose to have if they 
were in a position to decide, or might say when older they would 
not have chosen if they had been.  
In response it might be asserted, while acknowledging some 
degree of parental prerogatives on individual rights grounds, 
that society as a whole may intervene in the parent-child 
relationship so as to protect the individual rights of children 
as against their parents.90  Or it might be asserted that society 
as a whole has a collective interest in raising children that is 
as strong as or stronger than the parental prerogative claim, 
and consequently that society has the right to intervene in or 
supplant entirely the parental raising of children when that 
serves the common good.91
89 See Casey, supra note 50, at 899-900 (parental consent requirement for 
abortion by minor child valid provided accompanied by by-pass procedure 
enabling minor to obtain abortion upon judicial determination that minor is 
mature enough to give consent or that abortion would be in her best 
interests).
90
 For example, while the fundamental right to raise their children entitles 
parents to educate their children in private school as against state 
requirement to enroll them in public school, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510 (1925), it is implicit in Pierce that compulsory education laws 
are valid and that the state may compel parents to educate their children in 
order to protect their best interests.  See also Prince, supra note 77, 
holding that parental prerogatives and free exercise of religion do not 
entitle parents to violate child labor laws.
91 Compare, e.g., GUTMAN, supra note 86, at 22-28 (considering and ultimately 
rejecting the “family state” model of education whose “defining feature…is 
that it claims exclusive educational authority as a means of establishing a 
harmony - one might say, a constitutive relation - between individual and 
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So the fact that children are involved may strengthen the 
argument for the forced integration of schools.  First, since 
children may not yet be in a position to freely choose with whom 
to associate, the collective interest in conditioning children 
to prefer integration may be as strong or stronger than the 
parental interest in conditioning them to prefer segregation.  
Second, society as a whole may have a legitimate interest, as a 
surrogate for children, to protect their right to receive an 
adequately balanced education so that they can more freely 
choose whether to factor race into their associational 
preferences as adults.92
Again, a contextual analysis is necessary in order to fully 
evaluate the strength of these competing considerations.  In the 
real world, not only may current preferences be culturally 
conditioned, but blacks and whites may not be on an equal 
footing in asserting and realizing their preferences.  For 
example, in some circumstances blacks may prefer integration but 
social good based on knowledge,” at 23); PAULA RAYMON, THE KIBBUTZ COMMUNITY AND 
NATION BUILDING 53-55, 233-36 (Princeton University Press 1981)(discussing the 
communal living arrangements, later largely abandoned, of children in the 
early years of the Israeli kibbutzim as based on the “socialist principle 
that the community should replace the family” and that “(t)he kibbutz and not 
the parents would provide for the child,” at 55, and the tension this caused 
particularly for mothers who desired a more family oriented approach to 
child-rearing).
92 See, e.g., GUTMAN, supra note 86; Smith v. Board of School Commissioners of 
Mobile County, 827 F.2d 684, 692 (11th Cir. 1987)(rejecting parental challenge 
to public school texts as teaching “religion of Humanism” in violation of 
establishment clause per the state’s “indisputably non religious purpose…to 
instill in…public school children such values as independent thought, 
tolerance of diverse views, self-respect, maturity, self-reliance and logical 
decision making”).
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opt for separation due to social pressure from whites who 
control their access to a livelihood or who express outright 
hostility to integration.93  Or blacks who prefer integration may 
choose separation because so many whites opt for separation that 
integrated settings are not available or because the available 
integrated settings are inaccessibly located or prohibitively 
expensive.94  Where those things occur, not only does it 
strengthen the arguments for forced integration just advanced, 
it also implicates those raised above in the discussion of 
forced integration where whites don’t want it but blacks do.
On the other hand, after a period of experimentation it may 
turn out that forced integration does not improve but in fact 
worsens race relations and increases people’s preferences for 
93
 See, e.g., ROBERT L. CRAIN, THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (Aldine Publishing 
Company 1968)(a study of school desegregation in 15 cities, some of which 
experienced resistance as hostile as mob violence and others a more 
cooperative response, and generally concluding that extent of actual conflict 
was overblown); National Urban League, The State of Black America-2001 at
http://www.nul.org/soba2001/sobaresults.html (reporting that 32% of blacks 
polled said they have chosen not to move somewhere because they felt 
unwelcome); Gary Orfield, Housing Segregation: Causes, Effects, Possible 
Causes, at note 25 (Harvard University Civil Rights Project 2001) at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/civilrights/publications/index2.html (“Black fears 
of violence and intimidation in some white communities are still serious 
obstacles to housing choice”); R.A.V. v City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 
(1992)(overthrowing as violation of free speech Bias-Motivated Crime 
Ordinance as applied to burning of cross on lawn of black family in 
predominantly white neighborhood).
94
 Since whites are still economically better off than blacks, see infra note 
99, they may use their greater wealth to isolate themselves in communities 
that are beyond the means of blacks and may use private deed restrictions or 
zoning to maintain the price of housing at levels too high for blacks to 
afford.  See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)(rejecting race-based equal protection 
challenge to denial by suburb of Chicago with over 64,000 residents of whom 
only 27 were black of rezoning for low cost housing where center city blacks 
would likely reside absent showing of discriminatory intent or purpose).  
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educational separation.95  Or it may be that blacks and whites 
continue to or increasingly prefer separation even after the 
effects of historic conditioning have attenuated.96  And perhaps 
95
 Here the real-world data is mixed and subject to differing interpretations.  
Orfield reports that Gallup polls during the 1990s showed majority and 
growing belief among both blacks and whites that integration improves 
education for both groups, while that at the same time both groups favored 
neighborhood schools.  Gary Orfield, Schools More Separate: Consequences of a 
Decade of Resegregation 6-7 (Harvard University Civil Rights Project 2001) at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/civilrights/publications/index2.html.  And a 
Public Agenda Foundation Survey of 1998 found that 80% of black parents and 
86% of whites believe improving educational quality is more important than 
integration.  STEVE FARKAS & JEAN JOHNSON, TIME TO MOVE ON: AFRICAN-AMERICAN AND WHITE 
PARENTS SET AN AGENDA FOR PUBLIC (Public Agenda Foundation 1998).  Measured over 
time, white support for the principle that blacks and whites should go to the 
same schools has increased substantially over the years, from 1956 when half 
supported separate schools to 1995 when 96% supported integrated schools.  
HOWARD SCHUMAN, CHARLOTTE STEEH, LAWRENCE BOBO & MARIA KRYSAN, RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: 
TRENDS AND INTERPRETATION 103(Harvard University Press 1997)[hereinafter RACIAL 
ATTITUDES](reporting on and analyzing Gallup, National Opinion Research 
Council, and other attitudinal polls).  When the issue is personalized, there 
has been a substantial increase in white willingness to send their children 
to school with blacks, although that willingness declines as the numbers 
change.  With few black students white willingness has been consistently high 
over the years; with half black students whites were evenly divided in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, but by the 1990s less than 20% voiced objections; 
with blacks in the majority white objection was in the 70% range in the 
earlier years, whereas by the mid 1990s whites were about evenly divided.  
Id., at 140-41.  On the other hand, whites have generally been unsupportive 
of forced integration.  As regards whether the federal government should “see 
to it” that white and black children go to school together, over the years 
whites consistently answered no more often than yes.  And whites have 
consistently opposed forced busing, although opposition has declined somewhat 
from over 80% between the mid 1970s and mid 1980s to 67% opposed in 1996.  
Id., at 123-25.  Black support over time for the principle of integrated 
schools has always been nearly unanimous, and blacks have expressed little 
opposition to attending school with whites no matter what the numbers. Id., 
at 240-41, 254-55.  Yet black support for federal efforts to “see to it” 
consistently declined from over 80% in the mid 1960s to less than 60% in the 
mid 1990s.  On the other hand, while blacks were about evenly divided between 
support for and opposition to forced busing when it first started in the mid 
to late 1970s, by the mid 1990s support for forced busing rose somewhat to 
about 60%.  Id., at 248-49.        
96
 The debate in recent years over whether previously de jure segregated 
schools should be relieved of their judicially supervised obligation to 
desegregate turns on differing perceptions of whether the vestiges of de jure 
segregation have in fact sufficiently attenuated, despite the persistence of 
de facto residential and school segregation, that school districts should not 
be held responsible for the on-going segregation.  See, e.g., Freeman v. 
Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495-96 (1992)(“Where resegregation is a product not of 
state action but of private choices, it does not have constitutional 
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at the same time, as a result of governmental efforts to 
equalize opportunity in other areas of social life, white 
dominance diminishes and the economic and political power of 
blacks and whites becomes more equal.  A society is certainly 
conceivable where ethnic groups freely choose to live and go to 
school separately in order to preserve their ethnic identity or 
because they just don’t get along well in those arenas, while 
they interrelate on equal terms in other areas of social life.  
Under such circumstances the justification for forced 
integration weakens, and the more it can be seen as violating 
the individual right to choose one’s associations.
Currently the United States seems somewhere in the middle.  
As a result of both voluntary and forced integration, school and 
neighborhood segregation decreased somewhat following the demise 
of mandatory segregation.  But most blacks and whites still 
continued to attend largely segregated schools and live in 
largely segregated neighborhoods, and racial separation in those
implications…As the de jure violation becomes more remote in time and these 
demographic changes intervene, it becomes less likely that a current racial 
imbalance in a school district is a vestige of the prior de jure system”); 
Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 
249-50 (1991)(standard for determining whether desegregation decree should 
have been terminated is whether school board “had complied in good faith with 
the desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of 
past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable”); id. at 
251-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(“I believe a desegregation decree cannot be 
lifted so long as conditions likely to inflict the stigmatic injury condemned 
in Brown I persists and there remain feasible methods of eliminating such 
conditions”).
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spheres has increased in recent years.97  Overt racial prejudice 
has decreased somewhat,98 and the avenues of opportunity have 
opened a bit;99 but blacks are still subjected to substantial 
97
 Racial segregation in schools began to diminish in the late 1960s and early 
1970s when courts began to vigorously enforce desegregation.  The degree of 
racial separation of black children reached its lowest point in the mid to 
late 1980s, has been increasing since then, and has now returned to about the 
level of the earlier years.  See, e.g., Erica Brandenburg & Chungmei Lee, 
Race in American Public Schools: Rapidly Resegregating School Districts
(Harvard University Civil Rights Project 2002) at http://www.law.harvard.edu/ 
civilrights/publications/index2.html; Orfield, supra note 95, at 11-12, 15-
16, 23-26, 28-42.  These studies attribute the increased school segregation 
of the 1990s to the movement of whites to suburbia, the increased 
concentration of minorities in central cities, and the Supreme Court’s 
deemphasis on desegregation.  See supra, note 96.  Orfield also reports on 
high and unchanging levels of residential segregation between 1980-2000.  
Orfield, supra note 93, at 39-40.  Despite black preference for and 
increasingly favorable attitudes of whites toward residential integration, 
see id., at notes 25, 44-45, 50, and infra note 98, segregation may be high 
in fact due to the wide income differentials between blacks and whites.  See 
infra, note 99.
98
 Over the years there has been a substantial increase in white willingness 
to vote for a black presidential candidate (from 63% no in 1958 to 95% yes in 
1997) and in favorable attitudes toward interracial marriage (from 62% 
support for laws against intermarriage in 1963 to 87% opposition in 1996 and 
from 96% disapproval of intermarriage in 1958 to 67% approval in 1997).  
RACIAL ATTITUDES, supra note 95, at 106-07.  White support for the principle of 
integrated education and in willingness for their children to attend 
integrated schools has also increased substantially, although they have been 
generally unsupportive of forced integration.  See infra note 95.  Likewise, 
while still somewhat ambivalent, whites have become more supportive of 
residential integration.  In 1963, 39% of whites strongly agreed and only 19% 
strongly disagreed that whites should have the right to keep blacks out of 
their neighborhoods, whereas by 1996 65% strongly disagreed and only 6% 
strongly agreed; similarly, white support for open housing laws grew from 34% 
in 1972 to 67% in 1996.  RACIAL ATTITUDES, supra note 95, at 106-07, 123-25.  
And while in 1958 45% of whites indicated they would definitely or might move 
if blacks moved next door and 79% if blacks moved into the neighborhood in 
great numbers, by 1997 the respective figures were 2% and 25%; similarly, 69% 
of whites preferred all or mostly white neighborhoods in 1972, whereas by 
1995 the figure declined to 43%.  Id., at 140-41.  See also Maria Krysan, 
Data Update to Racial Attitudes in America (2002) at http://tigger.uic.edu/ 
~krysan/racialattitudes.htm (reporting on polls showing a decline between 
1990 and 2000 from 48% to 31% in the number of whites opposed or strongly 
opposed to living in neighborhoods more than half black).
99
 The gap in high school graduation as between whites and blacks has 
decreased substantially over the years: in 1978, 67.9% of whites and 47.6% of 
blacks 25 and over had completed four or more years of high school, whereas 
by 1998 the gap had decreased to 83.7% for whites versus 76.0% for blacks; 
and for 25-29 year olds the completion rates for whites and blacks was 
virtually identical, 88.1% versus 87.6%; however, while the gap has decreased 
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racial discrimination,100 and whites still disproportionately 
dominate positions of power.101  Meanwhile the integrationist 
over the years, the graduation rate for blacks continues to lag behind that 
of whites (73.4% versus 81.6% in 1998) and the gap actually increased a bit 
between 1994-1998.  WILLIAM B. HARVEY, MINORITIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION 2000-2001, 
Tables 1 & 3 (American Council on Education 2001).  On the other hand, while 
many more blacks attend college now than before, due to a substantially lower 
graduation rate the gap in completion rates has not improved over the years; 
between 1978-1998 the four-or-more-years-of-college completion rate for 
blacks 25 years or older increased from 7.2% to 14.7%, while the rate for 
whites actually increased a bit more from 16.4% to 25.0%.  Id., at Tables 3, 
4 & 9.  Likewise the income gap between whites and blacks continues to be 
substantial, has remained about the same percentage-wise for the past 40 
years or so, and in gross dollars has grown substantially over that time.  In 
1967 mean family income for whites was $9,116 and for blacks was $5,916 or 
65% of that for whites, whereas in 1998 the figure for whites was $62,384 and 
for blacks was $38,563 or 62% of that for whites. Joint Center for Political 
and Economic Studies, Joint Center Data Bank, Income and Wealth at http:// 
www.jointcenter.org. 
100 See, e.g., Black/White Relations in the United States-1997 at http://www. 
gallup.com/poll/specialreports/socialaudits/sa970610.asp (1997 Gallup poll 
showing that between 25%-45% (depending on age and gender) of black 
respondents reported experiencing discrimination in the past 30 days while 
shopping, between 15%-32% while dining out, and between 10%-23% at work --
with the highest incidence in all categories reported by black men between 
18-34, 34% of whom also reported experiencing discrimination by police); 
Krysan, supra note 94 (reporting on 2000 survey showing 64% of blacks and 33% 
of whites believe discrimination is a cause of racial inequality, 1999 survey 
showing 59% of blacks believe blacks do not have as good a chance as whites 
to get jobs for which they are qualified, and 2001 survey showing 51% of 
blacks believe blacks do not have as good a chance as whites to get housing 
they can afford and 47% of not having as good a chance as whites of getting a 
good education whereas almost 90% of whites who believe they do); National 
Urban League, supra note 89 (reporting that of those blacks polled who have 
tried to get a mortgage 25% said they had experienced discrimination); 
Orfield, supra note 93, at notes 42-43 (reporting on continuing and massive 
discrimination against blacks in housing); U.S. Equal Opportunity Employment 
Commission, Race-Based Charges at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/race.html
(reporting during fiscal years 1992-2001 an annual average of more than 
29,000 complaints of race-based employment discrimination, roughly 12%-13% of 
which on the average and 19% in 2000/2001 received meritorious resolutions).     
101
 African-Americans comprise about 12% of the population of the United 
States.  U.S. Census Bureau, Profile of General Demographic Characteristics: 
2000.  Yet as of 1/31/00 the number of black elected officials, although at 
an all time high and almost seven times the number in 1970, represented less 
than 2% of all elected officials.  David A. Bositis, Black Elected Officials: 
A Statistical Summary, 2000 (Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, 
2002) at http://www.jointcenter.org/whatsnew/beo-2000/index.html.  And blacks 
represent less than 5% of federal judges and less than 4% of lawyers, and own 
only about 4% and account for less than 1% of the profits of the nation’s 
non-farm businesses.  Federal Judicial Center at http://air.fjc.gov/history/ 
judges_frm.html; ABA Commission on Racial and Ethnic Diversity in the 
Profession, Miles to Go 2000: Progress of Minorities in the Legal Profession
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push following the end of mandatory segregation seems to have 
waned somewhat in recent years,102 and there seems to be 
substantial support among both blacks and whites for school 
vouchers and other free choice options.103
At this juncture, therefore, it is an open question whether 
the considerations supporting efforts to promote school 
integration continue as once thought to outweigh those 
supporting freedom of choice.  If a shift to freedom of choice 
were to result in schools and communities available both for 
those blacks and whites preferring ethnic homogeneity and for 
those preferring diversity, and if it were to contribute to 
equalized opportunity for blacks, then freedom of choice would 
9 at http://www.abanet.org/minorities; U.S. Census Bureau, Black-Owned 
Businesses: 1997 (October 2000).     
102 See, e.g., FARKAS & JOHNSON, supra note 95 (reporting that both black and 
white parents believe educational quality to be more important than 
integration); National Urban League, supra note 93, (reporting on 2001 survey 
of black adults showing 60% believing the primary focus of black 
organizations should be economic opportunity, 24% political leadership, and 
only 7% integration).  But compare id. (also reporting that 80% of blacks 
polled prefer living in racially mixed neighborhoods); Orfield, supra note 93 
at note 25 (reporting on a 1997 Gallup poll showing that blacks 
overwhelmingly prefer integrated to all black areas); Orfield, supra note 95, 
at 7, 9-11 (arguing that continuing efforts to desegregate schools is 
consistent with black support for quality education in light of evidence that 
integration improves opportunities for blacks).   
103
 In a Washington Post Survey of 2001, 45% of the respondents supported and 
50% opposed vouchers.  In an American Viewpoint poll of 1997, containing 
somewhat different wording from the Washington Post Survey, 67% supported and 
28% opposed vouchers.  In Gallup polls on allowing the choice of private 
schools at public expense, in 1999 41% supported and 55% opposed, whereas in 
1993 24% supported and 74% opposed.  See Public Agenda at www.publicagenda. 
org.  The support for vouchers appears to be somewhat greater among blacks 
than whites, although the support among both groups may be declining.  In 
polls conducted by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, in 
1998 48.1% of blacks and 41.3% of whites supported vouchers, whereas in 1997 
the figures were 55.8% for blacks and 47.2% for whites.  See Joint Center 
Data Bank, National Opinion Poll 1996-2000 at www.jointcenter.org.  And the 
National Urban League, supra note 89, reported that 41% of blacks polled in 
2000 supported vouchers, but only 34% in 2001.   
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promote both associational and egalitarian values.  But freedom 
of choice would produce a stark conflict between these values, 
and therefore be of more dubious merit, if it were to result in 
an inferior education and reduced life chances for blacks.
E. Associational Issues When Society is a Party
Now let’s address associational conflicts when society 
itself is a party, and compare their resolution to how 
associational conflicts among the members of a society are 
handled.
First, let’s address situations when some party wants out 
of an existing relationship with a society, using emigration and 
secession as examples.  Currently, international law guarantees 
the right of people to freely leave their countries, and most 
countries adhere to this norm.104  This right came about only 
after an intense international campaign and against the 
objections of countries, mostly underdeveloped or from the 
Communist bloc, who feared that free emigration would hurt them 
through the loss of people whom they had devoted their resources 
to educate and train and who could contribute to their 
development.  However, the objectors succumbed to the pressure
104
 See Thomas Kleven, Why International Law Favors Emigration Over 
Immigration, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AMER. L. REV. 69, 71-73 (2002).  The right to 
leave is guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 13, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 12(1)&(2), and 
various regional treaties. 
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of the more powerful Western nations.105
Individualistic considerations support the right to freely 
emigrate, which is tantamount to empowering people who don’t 
want to associate anymore with their countries to unilaterally 
terminate that relationship.106  This is akin to allowing a party 
to a marriage to freely exit, and is in fact more favorable than 
the common practice under permissive divorce laws that allow 
unilateral termination but often require the relationship to 
continue through the imposition of support obligations.  
Analogously, some countries allow people to emigrate only after 
completing military or other mandatory public service and for 
professionals like doctors only after practicing for a time.107
Such limitations represent a balancing of interests as 
between the claimed individual right to associate or not with 
whom one chooses and collective considerations like compensating 
society for the benefits one has received during the 
association.  Looking at society as analogous to another person 
with whom a party might have an association, compensation might 
be justified in individualistic terms.  The receipt of benefits 
105
 For a history of the international recognition of the right to freely 
emigrate, see ALAN DOWTY, CLOSED BORDERS: THE CONTEMPORARY ASSAULT ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
111-41 (Yale University Press 1987).
106
 For a more thorough discussion of the individualistic and collective 
considerations relating to freedom of movement in the international context, 
see Kleven, supra note 104, at 74-83.
107 See generally U.S. Department of State, 1999 Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices (available on the Dept. of State’s website).  Cuba, for 
example, requires doctors and other professionals to practice 3 to 5 years 
before being eligible for an exit permit.
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from a society can be seen as giving rise to a tacit agreement 
to perform expected social obligations in return, or to an 
implied contract to do so lest the party otherwise be unjustly 
enriched at society‘s expense.  As noted above, Locke comes 
surprisingly close to using such reasoning to posit that thereby 
someone becomes permanently tied to a society, so that one 
cannot then sever the relationship without society’s consent.108
And societies are certainly conceivable where people are seen, a 
la Aristotle perhaps, as being irrevocably tied to their 
societies by virtue of being born into them -- much like family 
life is often viewed.
Although current international practice as regards 
emigration is not so collectively tilted, that is not the case 
with secession.  When a group of people occupying a particular 
portion of a country desire to withdraw and either form their 
own nation or join another, the current international standard 
and practice is that nations’ sovereignty over their territory 
entitles them to prevent secession without their consent.109
108 LOCKE, supra note 14, and accompanying text.
109
 I refer here to the ability of part of an established international State 
to freely secede without the consent of the State -- bearing in mind that 
since international law is still not very highly developed and is still 
heavily intertwined with power politics among nations, it is difficult to be 
definitive about it.  That said, the principles of self-determination and 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of a State would seem to imply that 
a State’s laws govern when parts of a State may withdraw.  If a State’s law 
permits withdrawal, even unilaterally, then there is consent.  If not, then 
it would seem that a State ordinarily has the right to prevent a unilateral 
secession, by force if necessary, and that other states are ordinarily 
obliged not to intervene (except perhaps to prevent the excessive use of 
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There is, though, a free association claim here, analogous to 
that of an emigrant, not to have to remain in a society against 
one’s will; or analogous to the claim of religious or other 
groups within a society of the right to a relatively autonomous 
sphere within which to pursue their destinies. 
Again, the explanation for this divergence seems one of 
context and scope, there being factors that heighten the 
significance of collective considerations when a portion of a 
country secedes.  When that happens not only are people lost but 
land and other resources as well, so that the harmful impact on 
the rest of society intensifies.  And while the cumulative 
effect of individual emigration can be substantial over time, 
secession may cause an immediate and tremendous impact that may 
be more difficult for a society to cope with.110  And unlike 
force or in those instances when there is a right to secede).  See JAMES 
CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 84-106, 114-18, 215-18 
(Clarendon Press 1979).  While a part of a State might assert that unilateral 
secession is justified by its own right of self-determination, the State’s 
right of self-determination would ordinarily seem to be overriding, except 
perhaps in the case of oppression or misgovernment of an area.  Id., at 86, 
100, 115-17 (referring to “the possibility that the principle [of self-
determination] will apply to territories which are so badly misgoverned that 
they are in effect alienated from the metropolitan State,” but suggesting 
that the concept is highly controversial and applicable if at all in modern 
times only to Bangladesh).  See also, infra, notes 111 and 119.  Now as a 
practical matter part of a State may be strong enough to successfully secede 
without consent, to establish de facto self-governance and other incidents of 
statehood, and to receive recognition as a State by the international 
community.  Here it would seem more appropriate to say not that the new State 
had a right to secede but that the international community has acknowledged 
practical reality and ratified the successful secession after the fact.  See
CRAWFORD, supra, at 248-66.
110
 Societies do at times suffer immediate mass emigrations in times of famine, 
war or internal strife, frequently resulting from oppression within the 
societies themselves.  See, e.g., infra note 119 (regarding the mass 
migration of millions of Hindus and Moslems between India and Pakistan 
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group autonomy within a society, secession entails a more 
complete departure from the association, whereas relatively 
autonomous groups within a society are still subject to its 
ultimate authority.
Still, if freedom of association is to be taken seriously 
as a fundamental individual and group right, areas that want to 
secede from a society have an interest that must be considered.  
This makes the reasons prompting secession relevant.  Thus a 
portion of a society wanting to secede because it is being 
oppressed by the rest of society would seem to have a stronger 
claim than one that wants to secede so as to gain control over 
the bulk of a society’s resources or engage in some practice 
like slavery that contravenes society’s fundamental values.111
And if society is not willing to let an area go, then it may 
have the obligation to accommodate the desire for separation by 
providing opportunities for relative autonomy, like 
decentralizing society into states or provinces with their own
following partition); Susanne Schmeidl, Conflict and Forced Migration: A 
Quantitative Review in GLOBAL MIGRANTS, GLOBAL REFUGEES 62 (Aristide R. Zolberg & 
Peter M. Benda, eds., Berghahn Books 2001).
111
 For commentary on the right to secede, see, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Secession 
and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INT’L L. 177 
(1991)(arguing for right to secede when territory illegally annexed but not 
on grounds of nationality or group cohesiveness alone); Alan Buchanan, 
Federalism, Secession, and the Morality of Inclusion, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 53 
(1995)(arguing for right to secede of groups suffering severe injustices at 
the hands of the state but otherwise no general right to secede); Robert W. 
McGee, The Theory of Secession and Emerging Democracies: A Constitutional 
Solution, 28 STAN. J. INT’L L. 451 (1992)(arguing for a right to secede). 
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governments and powers.112
Now let’s address situations when some party wants to 
establish an association with a society, using immigration and 
the merger of societies as examples.  Current international 
practice as regards immigration is the opposite from emigration.  
While a party is substantially free to leave and sever the 
relationship with one’s country, there is no comparable right to 
enter and become a member of another society.  Rather, pursuant 
to the principle of national sovereignty, societies have the 
virtually unfettered right to refuse entry to outsiders.113
Similarly, a society’s national sovereignty entitles it to 
reject mergers sought by other societies.114
This application of the principle of national sovereignty 
is akin within a society to a party’s asserting the absolute 
right to refuse associations with others.  But in that context 
we found reason to question the absoluteness of such a right, as 
when it would contribute to others’ oppression or harm the 
112 See, e.g., Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT’L L.
1, 66 (“In most instances, self-determination should come to mean not 
statehood or independence, but the exercise of what might be termed 
‘functional sovereignty.’  This functional sovereignty will assign to sub-
state groups the powers necessary to control political and economic matters 
of direct relevance to them, while bearing in mind the legitimate concerns of 
other segments of the population and the state itself”.). 
113 See KLEVEN, supra note 104, at 71.
114
 Prior to the now virtually world-wide extension of the nation-state system, 
a State’s acquisition of territory from indigent peoples not inhabiting a 
recognized state by conquest or cession (typically under threat of force) was 
commonplace.  See CRAWFORD, supra note 109, at 173-74.  In modern times, 
forcible annexation or consolidation would seem clearly to violate the 
principles of self-determination and non-intervention.  Id., at 106-07, 112-
13.
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society as a whole.  Consequently, so applied the principle of 
national sovereignty may overly protect nations’ self-
determination against legitimate competing considerations 
advanced by others wanting in.  On the other hand, there may be 
situations when a society is justified in rejecting or limiting 
associations with outsiders in its pursuit of collective self-
determination, as when it is not capable of providing for the 
newcomers or when the impact would so transform society that the 
opportunity for self-determination would be lost.  So, again, a 
balancing of interests is required, taking into account context 
and scope.
Let’s consider several scenarios, starting with 
immigration.  Because it is virtually absolute the principle of 
national sovereignty entitles nations to treat outsiders in ways 
that would violate the fundamental rights of members if done to 
them.  In this society, for example, while the government may 
not discriminate against its members on the basis of race, it 
may indiscriminately do so and did for much of the twentieth 
century when dealing with outsiders wanting to immigrate.115
Moreover, members of this society have the right to travel and 
settle where they please, such that states and localities may 
115 See KLEVEN, supra note 104, at 86-87.  Some commentators believe the U.S.’s 
immigration practices are still racist, if not as explicitly so as in the 
past.  See works cited at id., note 58.  
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not refuse to accept them as members of their communities.116
Yet as regards immigration a nation’s right to collective self-
determination overrides almost all competing considerations.  
The only exception is that if someone can find their way into a 
country, they may not be deported to another country where they 
would face persecution.117
This leaves very little play to individualistic values in 
other situations where human dignity is at stake.  Suppose a 
minority of the world’s population occupies a disproportionate 
share of the available land, wherein is located a 
disproportionate share of the world’s resources, and as a result 
enjoys a disproportionately higher standard of living.  And 
suppose people in other parts of the world are suffering due to 
burgeoning overpopulation and other factors to which the well-
off societies may have contributed, like colonial exploitation 
and environmental degradation.118  Under these circumstances, 
116 See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941)(invalidating statute 
prohibiting the transport of indigents into the state); Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U.S. 618 (1969)(invalidating statutes denying welfare assistance to 
residents of less than one year); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 
(1999)(invalidating statute limiting welfare benefits during first year of 
residency).
117
 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Articles 31-
33, adopted 28 July 1951 and entered into force 22 April 1954.
118
 The world’s population, now at about 6 billion, is expected to reach 
between 8 and 11 billion by 2050, and most of the population growth will be 
in the less developed parts of the world.  United Nations Population 
Division, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision 5, at http://www. 
un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2000/wpp2000_volume3.htm.  The 
relationship between population growth and poverty is unclear due to the 
multiplicity of variables that enter into the equation.  Does population 
growth in underdeveloped areas cause poverty, such that what is needed are 
efforts to control population growth so as to alleviate poverty?  Or does 
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according the well-off societies the absolute privilege to 
refuse admittance on the basis of the right of national self-
determination seems overly one-sided.  Indeed, it seems unlikely 
that nations would be accorded such a right under a more highly 
developed international order and that its existence today 
reflects the dominant power of the world’s richer nations over 
the rules of the game.
Similar considerations compete in the context of societal 
mergers.  To illustrate, let’s consider two hypotheticals: 
first, India proposes a reconsolidation with Pakistan into a 
single unified nation; second, Puerto Rico proposes that it be 
admitted to the United States as a state.  Although under 
poverty cause population growth, such that what is needed is development to 
reduce poverty which will in turn lead to reduced population growth?  The 
answer seems to be sometimes one, sometimes the other, sometimes both, and 
sometimes neither because other causal factors like environmental degradation 
are at play?  See, e.g., Alain Marcoux, Population and Environmental Change: 
from Linkages to Policy Issues (Sustainable Development Dept., Food and 
Agricultural Org. of the United Nations Jan. 1999) at http://www.fao.org/sd/ 
WPdirect/WPre0089.htm; Geoffrey McNicoll, Population and Poverty: The Policy 
Issues (Sustainable Development Dept., Food and Agricultural Org. of the 
United Nations Jan. 1999) at http://www.fao.org/sd/WPdirect/WPre0088.htm.  
Some argue along individualistic lines that the poorer countries should be 
responsible for solving their own developmental and poverty problems or 
suffer the consequences.  However, to the extent that poverty does cause 
population growth and that the countries experiencing the greatest population 
growth are poor as a result of past and present exploitation by the richer 
nations, then the argument that as recompense the richer nations should 
somehow assist through helping to relieve the population strain or with 
economic development and family planning becomes strong even in 
individualistic terms.  See, e.g., ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, CAPITALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 
IN LATIN AMERICA (Monthly Review Press 1967); Edward Goldsmith, Development as 
Colonialism, in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 253 (Jerry Mander and Edward 
Goldsmith, eds., Sierra Club Books 1996); WALTER RODNEY, HOW EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED 
AFRICA (Howard University Press 1981).  Moreover, a more communal view of the 
world as an interdependent community might suggest that the world’s richer 
nations have a duty to aid the less-well-off whatever the causes of the 
disparities. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND 
EQUALITY 31-51 (Basic Books 1983)(discussing the “duty to aid”).
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current international practice both Pakistan and the United 
States have the absolute right to reject these associations, 
there are competing considerations and arguable differences 
between the two situations.
One difference is that while what is now India and Pakistan 
was unified under British colonialism, that relationship was 
severed and the two are now independent nations;119 whereas as a 
territory of the United States Puerto Rico is arguably already a 
member of the society,120 and is seeking the full-fledged 
119
 The division of the subcontinent into separate nation-states along largely 
religious/ethnic lines, India being largely Hindu and Pakistan largely 
Muslim, is an outgrowth of both the area’s pre-colonial history and the 
impact of British domination of the subcontinent between the middle of the 
19th and 20th centuries.  See, e.g., TALBOT, supra note 65, at 1-133.  Despite 
Indian efforts to bring about a unified, multi-ethnic, secular nation in 
which Hindus would be the substantial majority, Pakistani/Muslim separatism 
led to partition and the establishment of India and Pakistan (with a western 
and eastern portion on opposite sides of India) as separate nation-states in 
1947, accompanied by the mass migration of millions of mostly Muslims from 
India to Pakistan and of mostly Hindus from Pakistan to India.  Id., at 134-
61.  Both countries contain and have experienced struggles among various 
minority religious and ethnic groups.  In Pakistan, Bengali separatism led to 
the break away of Pakistan’s eastern wing and the formation of Bangladesh as 
an independent nation in 1971.  Id., at 252-59.  India has experienced Sikh 
ethno-nationalism and demands for internal autonomy as well as secession in 
the Punjab region.  Id., at 265-73.  And India and Pakistan have been at 
loggerheads since independence.  See infra, note 123. 
120
 U.S. interest in Puerto Rico stems back to the earliest days of the nation.  
Following the Spanish-American War Spain ceded Puerto Rico to the U.S. in 
1899, and Puerto Rico was made and has since remained a dependent territory 
of the U.S.  JOSÉ TRÍAS MONGE, PUERTO RICO: THE TRIALS OF THE OLDEST COLONY IN THE WORLD
21-29 (Yale University Press 1997).  In 1900 a civil government under the 
ultimate control of the U.S. was established.  Id. at 36-43.  In 1917, Puerto 
Ricans were granted American citizenship.  Id. at 67-76.  In 1951, following 
a referendum approving it and subject still to ultimate U.S. authority, 
Puerto Rico became self-governing and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico was 
established; and in 1952 the citizenry adopted and Congress approved Puerto’s 
Constitution.  Id. at 107-18.  Throughout its history as a territory Puerto 
Rico’s economy has been integrated into and dependent on that of the U.S.  
James L. Dietz & Emilio Pantojas-García, Puerto Rico’s New Role in the 
Caribbean: The High-Finance/Maquiladora Strategy in COLONIAL DILEMMA: CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON CONTEMPORARY PUERTO 103 (Edwin Melendez & Edgardo Meléndez, eds., 
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statehood that other members have.121  To analogize to 
interpersonal relationships, one might say that India and 
Pakistan were at one time married, divorced, and are now 
independent parties deciding whether to renew the marriage; 
while the United States and Puerto Rico are now de facto married
as at common law, and that Puerto Rico wants that status 
legitimized so that it can receive all the benefits of a formal 
marriage.  
Secondly, the history of the relations between Pakistan and 
India differs from that between the United States and Puerto 
Rico, and the impact of a merger on Pakistan and the United 
States differs.  India and Pakistan split in large part because 
of the internal conflict between Hindus and Muslims, and there
is on-going animosity between the two.122  So if consolidated 
South End Press 1993); Edwin Meléndez, Politics and Economic Reforms in Post-
War Puerto Rico, id. at 79.  
121
  The issue of Puerto Rico’s status has been debated since the beginning.  
See MONGE, supra note 120.  Within Puerto Rico there have been three non-
binding plebiscites: in 1967, 1993 and 1998.  In all three there has been 
substantial support for statehood, ranging from 39% in 1967 to almost 47% in 
1998.  Independence has received minimal support, well below 5%.  In 1967 and 
1993, commonwealth status outpolled statehood, although by a much larger 
margin in 1967 (60% to 39%) than in 1993 (48.6% to 46.3%).  See http:// 
electionspuertorico.org/1998/summary.html; http://electionspuertorico.org/ 
archivo/1967.html.  Interpreting the results of the 1998 plebiscite is 
difficult, due to the fact that statehood and independence were competing 
with two commonwealth-like alternatives -- one similar to the present status 
of subjection to the ultimate authority of Congress and the other consisting 
of full self-governance subject to as yet undefined economic and defense ties 
to the U.S. and with U.S. citizenship only for those already having it and 
their descendents -- each of which received less than 1% support and with 
none of the above which received 50% of the vote.  See Elections in Cuba, 
1998 Plebiscite Status Definitions at http://elecciones puertorico.org/ 
home_en.html.   
122
 The on-going animosity has resulted in four wars and several near wars, and 
has revolved largely around the Kashmir region of India, whose population is 
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with India into a unified nation where they would be a small and
disfavored minority, and even if India should commit to a 
relatively autonomous provincial status for Pakistan, Pakistani 
Muslims have a legitimate concern that they might be oppressed 
and unable to freely pursue group self-determination.  Puerto 
Rico, on the other hand, is arguably already part of this 
society, has many of the responsibilities (e.g., military 
service, subjection to U.S. law) but not all the benefits (e.g., 
seats in Congress, the right to vote for President) of 
statehood,123 and may have lost other opportunities to flourish 
had it been left alone.  Under these circumstances Pakistan 
would seem on balance to have a stronger claim than the United 
States to avoid an unwanted relationship with the other party.  
And if the United States were unwilling to admit Puerto Rico as 
a state, at a minimum it would seem obligated, after arguably 
forcing it into an unwanted relationship in the first place, to 
allow Puerto Rico to become an independent nation if it so 
chooses.
F. Conclusion
While the casual remark that people should be free to
largely Muslim and which both countries claim.  The causes of the conflict 
are varied and contested, and include not only the religious/ethnic factor 
but also both countries’ efforts at nation-building and other geo-political 
factors as well.  See, e.g., SUMIT GANGULY, CONFLICT UNENDING: INDIA-PAKISTAN TENSIONS 
SINCE 1947 (Columbia University Press 2001).  
123 MONGE, supra note 120, at 162-64; InfoPlease, Puerto Rico at http://info 
please.com/ipa/AO113949.html. 
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choose with whom to associate or not to associate may often be 
an appropriate response, I have tried to show that in many 
contexts it is not.  At times it may be appropriate for society 
to prevent associations harmful to a party involved or to 
society as a whole.  And at times it may be appropriate to 
impose associations on parties, even highly intimate 
associations, when they have made commitments that others have 
relied on or when it serves the common good.  And at times these 
considerations may be implicated when society itself is a party 
to a contested relationship.
Inevitably, when associational conflicts arise, there will 
be assertions of individual and group rights and of collective 
interests on all sides, and it will be necessary to assess the 
strength of the competing considerations in social context.  
Rather than attempting to thoroughly categorize the relevant 
contexts and considerations, I have tried to establish that the 
notion of free choice in associations is overly simplistic and 
to illustrate the point with enough examples to show that 
associational conflicts are ubiquitous in social life and relate 
to issues -- like marriage, race relations, membership in 
society, and others discussed herein -- that are central to 
human dignity and the well-being of society.  
As always when there is conflict over such issues, there 
may be many perspectives and passionate disagreement over the 
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appropriate outcome and who should be empowered to decide.  The 
struggle for power in social life is on-going, and associational 
conflicts are at the heart of the struggle.
